AD A045382

Part II

THE ROLE OF AMBIGUITY IN STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

———

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

San Diego State University

———

by

Ronald Evan Blum

Summer 1976

D D C

OCT 20 1977

D

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER CI 77-30, *Part II*	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER ⑭ AFIT-CI-77-30-
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) ⑥ The Role of Ambiguity in Strategic Deterrence, *Part II.*		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Thesis *Pt-2* 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) ⑩ DONALD E. BLUM CAPTAIN, USAF		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) ⑨ *Masters thesis,*
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS AFIT Student at San Diego State University, San Diego, California		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS AFIT/CI Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433		12. REPORT DATE ⑪ 1976 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 161 pa ⑫ *169 p.*
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

JERRAL F. GUESS, Captain, USAF
Director of Information, AFIT   APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE AFR 190-17.

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

Attached

012200

CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDY: SOVIET THREATS DURING

THE SUEZ CRISIS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to supply empirical evidence of how and why ambiguity was employed in a specific deterrence attempt. Though the Suez Crisis is tremendously interesting historically, its value to the present paper will be dete   d by how readily the history of the crisis leads to the formulation of theoretical hypotheses.

As the title indicates, the focus of the chapter is on Soviet threats and actions. This tends to skew the historical telling so as to overemphasize the Soviet role in the crisis. The reader should keep sight of the fact that the Soviet Union played only a peripheral role in the crisis until the evening of 5 November 1956.

Though intense political maneuvering continued well beyond the military cease-fire in Egypt, for the purpose of this chapter, the cease-fire will be considered the last event of historical interest.

Discussion of subsequent events, such as the Moscow-
Cairo crisis and the missile gap are included only
because they shed light on prior Soviet perceptions and
motives.

Historical study of the Suez Crisis raises some
problems concerning sources. Many of the participants
have published memoirs that provide a rich source of
data. The memoirs of Western statesmen are generally
valuable, though the reader must be alert for the
effects of hindsight and the inevitable penchant for
smoothing over what may have been a very rough episode
in one's career. One must be as alert to what is
omitted as to what is included; for instance, Sir
Anthony Eden's memoirs contain no mention of the Sèvres
accord or the collusion it represents. Memoirists
often tend to "forget" embarrassing errors made in the
past and to "reinterpret" their original motives.

To the normal problems inherent in extracting
historical truth from self-interested memoirs, one must
add the particular problems posed by Soviet sources.
In the first place there are few such primary sources
available to the Western researcher. The closed nature
of the Soviet society bars the historian from the give
and take of Soviet politics and foreign policy formula-
tion, contributing to an inevitably sterile and

speculative approach. Khrushchev's memoirs are invaluable for the present study, as are The Penkovskiy Papers. However, in the end one must rely heavily on Soviet actions as an index of Soviet perceptions and motives. Western intelligence efforts, having only recently surmounted the difficulties in learning what capabilities the Soviets possess, are still hindered by the difficulty in forecasting intent. Historians suffer under the same limitations.

In historical terms, Suez happened only yesterday. Temporally, we are so close to the events of the crisis that accounts of it are still tendentious and influenced by the Cold War. The Suez Crisis is very much "alive" historically, because fresh interpretations of the crisis are published almost yearly. The best work on Suez undoubtedly is still to be done, partly because certain documents of basic importance, including the Sèvres accord, have yet to be released. Since 1956 the Middle East has certainly lost none of its prominence as a world trouble spot and an arena for superpower competition. As a result, the scholarly study of Soviet foreign policy in that area of the globe can only be described as having "taken off" in the 1970s.

Suez represents the juncture of many independent

streams--the end of European colonialism, the diminished postwar importance of Britain and France, the Arab-Israeli conflict, strains in the NATO alliance, the Cold War, the emergence of nuclear strategy, and brinkmanship as a diplomatic tool. It is the author's hope that he has preserved some of the richness and drama while engaging in the pursuit of theory.

Historical Background

King Farouk was ousted from the Egyptian throne by a virtually bloodless coup on 23 July 1952. Infighting was inevitable, and in February 1954 Gamal Abdel Nasser supplanted the more moderate General Neguib as leader of the revolutionary movement and mentor of a new Egypt.

Soviet reaction to the revolution was cool due to Nasser's consistent persecution of indigenous Communists.[1] However with de-Stalinization came a reversal in the previous hard line towards neutral nationalist movements. After the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 the existence of a legitimately neutral Third World was recognized.[2]

---

[1]David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961), p. 391.

[2]P. J. Vatikiotis, "The Soviet Union and Egypt:

        While the passing of Stalin was beneficial for

Soviet relations with the Third World, it had an

extremely destabilizing effect on the East European

satellites. Unrest in East Germany and a narrowly

averted revolution in Poland were followed by open

rebellion in Hungary in October 1956. Hungarian

dissidents, encouraged by the rhetoric of Radio Free

Europe and the Voice of America, vainly attempted to

convert Hungary to a neutral posture patterned after

Tito's Yugoslavia. The revolt was squashed by Soviet

troops and tanks on 4 November. The fact that the Suez

and Hungarian Crises came to a head simultaneously has

spurred speculation that the two events were related.

In retrospect, it appears likely that their causes

were unrelated, but their outcomes were not. The West

was too preoccupied with Suez to intervene in Hungary.

Likewise, Hungary was far more important than Egypt to

the Soviets; they would not commit themselves in the

Middle East until victory in Eastern Europe was assured.

        A bloody Israeli raid into the Gaza Strip on

29 February 1955 had a disproportionately severe impact

The Nasser Years," in The Soviet Union and the Middle
East, eds. Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich (Stan-
ford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), pp.
122-23; also Ronald E. McLaurin, The Middle East in
Soviet Policy (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975),
p. 10.

on Nasser's military policy because his regime was still

on shaky ground. In the face of the increased Israeli

threat heralded by David Ben-Gurion's return to the

Israeli Cabinet and the Gaza Raid, Nasser could no

longer resist internal rightist pressures to rearm.

Nasser turned to the Russians for arms only after being

rebuffed by Egypt's traditional Western suppliers, who

were miffed by Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact.

In May 1955 the Soviets agreed in principle to supply

Nasser with arms, using Czechoslovakia as a front.

Nasser had understandable reservations about shifting

to the Soviet Union for armaments. He knew the move

would further alienate him from the West, but his

greatest fear was that dependence on Soviet spare parts

and ammunition would provide the Soviet Union with

leverage over his regime. Nasser was won over by four

factors: (1) it was imperative that he obtain arms

quickly; (2) the Soviet terms were distinguished by

their lack of strings;[3] (3) the Soviets accepted payment

in kind, meaning Egyptian cotton, which had been subject

to the vagaries of Western markets; and (4) Nasser was

relieved of the contradiction of depending on Western

---

[3]Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third World:
Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1969), pp. 161-62.

arms while simultaneously trying to reduce Western influence in Egypt.[4]

By September 1956 Egypt possessed vast quantities of Soviet arms, including 40 Il-28 light jet bombers and 150 MiG-15 fighters.[5] A Middle East arms race was rapidly developing, with Israel receiving sophisticated military hardware from France to balance Soviet aid to Egypt. The new Socialist Premier of France, Guy Mollet, saw it to be in France's interest to support Israel's military buildup. Mollet shared with Ben-Gurion the perception of Nasser as a Hitler. Additionally, Mollet hoped that the Algerian rebellion could be paralyzed by an Israeli strike at Egypt. Israel was eager to receive the French arms, since the Eisenhower administration was noticeably pulling away from Truman's aggressively pro-Israeli stand.

On 16 May 1956 Nasser extended diplomatic recognition to Communist China to ensure the availability of a source of arms should a threatened UN embargo on Middle East arms shipments become a reality. Nasser's recognition of China became the decisive

---

[4]Robert R. Bowie, Suez 1956 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 11.

[5]John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 197.

factor in John Foster Dulles' abrupt refusal to approve American loans for the Aswan High Dam.[6] The American renege on the Aswan High Dam offer became the immediate excuse for Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956.

Before discussing the nationalization and ensuing events, it is necessary to discuss English interests and actions. The most pressing issue of postwar Egyptian politics had been the removal of British troops from the Canal Zone at a time when the canal loomed more important than ever because of the Cold War and increasing importance of Middle Eastern oil. In October 1954 Britain finally agreed to withdraw all remaining troops from the Canal Zone. The withdrawal was complted in June 1956.

Anthony Eden, having served in the shadow of Winston Churchill through the war years, became Prime Minister in April 1955. Eden brought with him a generally favorable attitude towards Nasser and the Arab states. However, on 1 March 1956 Jordan's King Hussein dismissed General John Bagot Glubb, head of the Arab Legion and "the last symbol of the old British

---

[6] Kenneth Love, Suez; The Twice-Fought War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 219; also Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 51.

paternalistic hegemony in the Middle East."[7]   Because

Eden felt Nasser to have been the prime force behind

Glubb's removal, he reversed his entire attitude toward

Nasser:

> On that fatal day he decided that the world was
> not big enough to hold both him and Nasser. The
> "Egyptian dictator" had to be eliminated somehow
> or other, else he would destroy Britain's posi-
> tion in the Middle East and Eden's position as
> Prime Minister of Great Britain.[8]

Nasser appeared to be fulfilling Eden's prophecy

when he announced that he was nationalizing the Suez

Canal, ostensively to use the revenue thus gained to

finance the Aswan High Dam. Eden, vindicated in his

own strong stand against appeasement of Hitler in the

thirties, saw anything less than a military response to

the canal seizure as the beginning of another era of

appeasement.[9]

Britain and France were both predisposed to

reoccupy the Canal Zone immediately. Eden later main-

tained that military action was delayed first by the

necessity to seek peaceful means of redress, and second

---

[7]Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper & Row,
1967), p. 24.

[8]Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson (New York:
Clarkson N. Potter, 1967), pp. 17-18.

[9]Anthony Eden, The Suez Crisis of 1956 (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1960), p. 60.

by inadequate airlift capacity and lack of trained
paratroops.[10]

Following the nationalization there occurred a
diplomatic interlude which was characterized by
startlingly different perceptions among Western leaders.
Britain and France were going through the motions of
exhausting all peaceful means of solution in the
expectation that in the end the United States would
assent to the use of military force. On the American
side of the Atlantic, Dulles was blatantly stalling,
hoping that the passage of time would defuse the issue.
While Dulles used the time thus gained to seek a
negotiated end to the problem, Britain and France kept
tensions high and continued military preparations.

If Eden and Mollet were not in a mood to
negotiate, then neither was Nasser, who had gained
tremendous popularity throughout the Arab world follow-
ing the nationalization. Nasser did not send a delega-
tion to the first London Conference (16-23 August), but
his position was effectively supported by the Soviet
Union, which had called the nationalization "a correction
of a historic error."[11] The Soviet Union was happy to
be afforded the opportunity to support Egypt against the

---

[10]Ibid., pp. 57-58.   [11]Love, p. 401.

"imperialist" and "colonialist" Western powers.

A second London Conference convened in mid-September and approved the formation of the Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA). Again, Dulles' and Eden's perceptions and purposes diverged. Eden envisioned an armed convoy that would shoot its way through the canal if challenged by Nasser. In a pattern that was becoming familiar by now, Dulles undercut Eden's position by publicly renouncing any intention to enforce SCUA militarily.

Meanwhile, Egypt's unexpectedly conciliatory position at the UN alarmed Paris and London, who did not want their military designs undercut by a premature political solution. Therefore, when Egypt accepted an Anglo-French draft resolution, an obviously unacceptable section was added in order to preclude the relaxation of tensions.

Since French and Israeli objectives were best served by direct military action, neither country was unduly concerned with legal considerations in their preliminary planning for joint military operations. However, both Ben-Gurion and Mollet were hesitant to act without British military support. In the end the price of British cooperation was a sweeping change in the entire philosophy of the armed venture. Britain

was on a diplomatic tightrope. By early October it was evident that Dulles would never acquiesce to a blatant military operation against Nasser; yet it was becoming increasingly apparent that Nasser, diplomatically supported by both superpowers, could be toppled only by military action.

Britain, France, and Israel agreed on a joint plan at Sèvres on 24 October. Israel was to attack through the Sinai on 29 October and appear to threaten the canal. The British and French would then issue an ultimatum calling on Israel and Egypt to withdraw ten miles from the canal. Egypt would be asked to accept a temporary Anglo-French military occupation of the canal --to which Nasser of course would never accede. This would provide the pretext for military operations against Egypt. Britain and France would land troops on 6 November (election day in the US) if the week of "aeropsychological operations" preceding the landings had not already weakened civilian morale enough to topple Nasser.

Military operations commenced on the afternoon of 29 October with a drop of 395 Israeli paratroops into the Mitla Pass, only thirty miles east of the canal.[12]

---

[12]Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 77.

The emplacement of this force had little to do with Israel's actual military objective, the capture of Sharm al-Sheikh, which controlled the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. On the morning of 30 October the British Cabinet, all of whose members were privy by now to Eden's collusion, met and "decided" to send an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel. Eden told the House of Commons later in the day, "in the actions we have now taken we are not concerned to stop Egypt, but to stop war."[13] Egyptian rejection of the ultimatum led to the beginning of air attacks on Egyptian airfields. Nasser, realizing an Anglo-French invasion was imminent, abandoned the Sinai to the advancing Israelis and pulled his forces back behind the canal to defend Egypt proper.

By the time of the first air attacks on Egypt, Britain and France had already vetoed two Security Council cease-fire resolutions. On 31 October the Security Council adopted a Yugoslavian resolution calling for an emergency session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution. While the

---

[13]Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 558 (1956): 1450-56, cited by U.S., Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East September 1956-June 1957, Near and Middle Eastern Series 25 (August 1957), p. 145 (hereafter cited as United States Policy).

bombing continued, the General Assembly passed an American cease-fire resolution in the early morning hours of 2 November. Egypt accepted the cease-fire immediately. Ben-Gurion, aware of Israel's vulnerability to UN sanctions, declared Israel's acceptance of the cease-fire the next day.

Eden and Mollet "almost jumped out of their skins" when they heard of the Israeli cease-fire, since this would completely undermine the pretext for the planned troop landings.[14] They persuaded Ben-Gurion to retract the cease-fire and continue hostilities. Ben-Gurion reluctantly acceded to the entreaties of his allies, and on 4 November Abba Eban announced in the UN that a de facto but not a de jure cease-fire existed in the Sinai. The pretext for landings was maintained.

Eden came under increased pressure from the UN to effect a cease-fire and from the French to speed up the invasion timetable. While fighting a holding action in the UN, Eden then justified the impending invasion as necessary to "secure the speedy withdrawal of Israeli forces."[15] Ben-Gurion was enraged and reneged on his cease-fire renege. Sharm al-Sheikh had been captured on the morning of 5 November. Ben-Gurion,

---

[14]Love, p. 573.   [15]Ibid., p. 574.

always distrustful of the English, had no desire to
jeopardize Israel's military gains by allowing Eden to
turn on him in the Sinai.

On 4 November the UN adopted a Canadian-
sponsored plan to create a UN Emergency Force that would
take up positions between the Egyptians and Israelis
along the canal. Eden then shifted his justification
for invasion to the claim that intervention "by an
impartial force" was necessary until the UNEF actually
arrived on the scene.[16]

```
London          Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)
Paris           GMT + 1 hour
Port Said       GMT + 2 hours
Moscow          GMT + 3 hours
Washington      GMT - 5 hours
```

Fig. 8. Important Suez Crisis time zones.

French and British paratroops jumped over Port
Said at 0820 5 November and met little organized
resistance. A report of a local temporary cease-fire
was erroneously interpreted by Eden and announced in
Commons as news of a general Egyptian surrender. That
course of events certainly would have been heartening to
Eden, since the Israelis had captured Sharm al-Sheikh

---

[16]Eden, p. 196.

at 0930 that morning, marking the end of Israeli involvement just as the French and British were landing. Unfortunately, the optimistic announcement was shown to be premature, since armed resistance started up again in Port Said around 2230.

At 0100 6 November (Moscow time) the Soviet Union broadcast the text of threatening messages addressed to Britain, France, and Israel, which later formed the basis of Soviet claims to have brought about the final cease-fire. Nevertheless, the Anglo-French amphibious landing at Port Said began early the next morning as scheduled. At 0945 Eden, in failing health and under pressure from his Cabinet, made the final decision to declare a cease-fire. The French could not continue military operations without the British, so they reluctantly agreed to the cease-fire, which went into effect at midnight London time (0200 7 November in Port Said).

The first UNEF troops arrived in Egypt on 15 November, and the British and French completed their withdrawal on 22 December. The greatest postwar problem was uprooting Israeli forces from the Sinai and Gaza Strip. Under pressure from the UN and the United States, Israel completed its military withdrawal from Egyptian territory on 16 March 1957 in return for a

guarantee that the UNEF in Sharm al-Sheikh would
guarantee the use of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli
shipping.

The Suez fiasco, as it is often termed, afforded
no gains to Britain or France. Anthony Eden's guiding
perception that the world was not big enough for both
himself and Nasser proved to be all too true, as Eden
was forced to leave office for reasons of health in
January 1957. The French of course later lost Algeria.
Both countries were made aware that they now occupied
a position in the second tier of world powers and that
effective action without American support henceforth
would be impossible. Partly as a reaction to Suez,
Britain drew closer to the American nuclear guarantee
through its "special relationship," while France under
de Gaulle developed her own nuclear force. In terms of
prospects for a lasting Middle East peace, rather than
settling any issues, Suez 1956 merely became the second
of four wars Egypt and Israel would fight within a
twenty-six year span.

Analysis of the Soviet Threat Messages

Within the space of five hours, from 2000 5
November to 0100 6 November (Moscow time) the Soviet
government communicated five separate messages to five

179

addressees. These five messages constituted the threat

system mobilized by the Soviet Union against Britain,

France, and Israel. The messages contained various

internal ambiguities and also contradicted one another.

The definition of an ambiguous threat was fulfilled:

the source ensured that the target would be uncertain

of the intended meaning.

The first two messages were delivered at 2000

5 November. Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov cabled

the President of the UN Security Council, calling for

an immediate UNSC meeting to discuss noncompliance with

the General Assembly cease-fire resolution of 2

November.[17] Included in the cable was the text of a

draft resolution calling for a cease-fire within

twelve hours of passage and complete withdrawal of

troops within three days. This constituted an explicit-

ly stated demand. The draft resolution contained the

most explicitly stated sanction of all the messages:

> The Security Council, in accordance with
> Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, con-
> siders it essential that all States Members of
> the United Nations, especially the United States
> of America and the USSR, as permanent members of
> the Security Council having powerful air and
> naval forces at their disposal, should give
> military and other assistance to the Egyptian
> Republic, which has been the victim of aggres-
> sion, by sending naval and air forces, military

---

[17]See Appendix B for complete text of all five
messages constituting the threat system.

units, volunteers, military instructors and
other forms of assistance, if the United
Kingdom, France and Israel fail to carry out
this resolution within the stated time limits.[18]

Shepilov concluded by citing the Soviet Union's
readiness to send to Egypt the air and naval forces
necessary to curb the aggressors and defend the victims
of aggression.

The Shepilov cable was the first allusion to
possible use of Soviet forces in the Middle East. The
Soviet press had mentioned volunteers in the previous
week, but few Western statesmen had been intimidated.
The draft resolution was to be placed before the
Security Council where it would be subject to Anglo-
French veto, rather than before the veto-proof General
Assembly that was already meeting under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution. Therefore, since the Soviets could
hardly expect passage of their draft resolution in the
Security Council, one must search for an ulterior motive
in the cable.[19] No mention was made of the UN Emergency
Force that had been approved on 4 November by the

[18]UN Document S/3736, 5 November 1956, cited in
United States Policy, p. 179.

[19]In point of fact, the draft resolution was
never even considered in the UNSC. The vote against
consideration of the item was 4-3 with 4 abstentions.
See A. G. Mezerik, ed., The Suez Canal; 1956 Crisis-
1967 War (New York: International Review Service, 1969),
p. 38.

General Assembly. This is significant because pre-

sumably after the approval of the UNEF, any UN-imposed

military solution would have to be incorporated within

the framework of the UNEF and would operate under a

blue flag.[20] By specifically mentioning the readiness

of Soviet forces to act against the aggressor nations

and by calling for the United States to participate in

armed operations against its NATO allies, the draft

resolution was the first step toward placing the United

States in a diplomatic no-win situation. It would have

been unthinkable for the US to oppose British and French

forces in Egypt. American diplomatic pressure against

its European allies had already weakend the NATO

alliance; American military opposition, even under the

UN flag, would have dealt it a death blow. The Soviets

could be expected to capitalize.on the failure of the

US to back up its words with any sort of action,

---

[20]Actually, Soviet refusal to recognize the
validity of a UNGA-created UNEF was consistent with
their longstanding legal position, as well as supportive
of their political goals in this particular case. Since
the original Uniting for Peace Resolution that created
the UN Command in Korea, the Soviet position had been
that the UN Charter empowers only the Security Council
to establish an international armed force. The obvious
advantage to the Soviet Union is that they stand to
retain veto power over construction of any prospective
UNEF designed to frustrate them in any of their uni-
lateral actions, such as Hungary 1956 or Czechoslovakia
1968. See G. I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law,
trans. William E. Butler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1974), pp. 340-43.

revealing the US as a hypocritical accessory of the
British, French, and Israeli colluders.

Supportive of the Shepilov cable, yet having a
life of its own, was Nikolai A. Bulganin's letter to
Eisenhower. The letter proposed "joint and immediate
use" of Soviet and American military forces "to put an
end to aggression and to stop any further bloodshed."[21]
The letter was blatantly ambiguous as to whether this
proposal merely complemented the simultaneously sub-
mitted draft resolution or if it represented a call for
joint action totally independent of the UN. An intent
to work within the scope of the UN could be inferred
because the use of joint force was to be "according to
a decision of the United Nations." Yet there was no
indication in the letter that employment of such force
would hinge upon passage of the draft resolution.
Indeed, the following paragraph indicates that the
note represented an initiative totally independent of
the draft resolution:

> The Soviet Government is ready to enter into
> immediate negotiations with the Government of
> the United States on the practical realization
> of the above-mentioned proposals, so that effec-
> tive action in the interests of peace might be
> undertaken within the next hours.[22]

---

[21]United States Policy, p. 181.

[22]Ibid.

Bulganin's letter to Eisenhower alluded to
Soviet and American atomic and hydrogen weapons and
noted that, "if this war is not stopped it carries the
danger of turning into a third world war."[23] The
Soviets knew that the US could never join in military
opposition to NATO nations; yet by now it was clear to
the Soviet Union that the US was genuinely trying to
pressure its NATO allies into quitting their military
adventure. The Soviets realized that if they could
successfully walk a diplomatic tightrope, they would
be able to reap a double advantage from a cease-fire
imposed by the US on its own allies. Of primary
importance, a cease-fire in itself was of no great
advantage to the Soviet Union unless the Soviets would
be in position to take credit for it. Second, by
allowing the United States to pressure its own allies
into a cease-fire, the already existing rift within NATO
could be widened, perhaps irreparably. By means of the
five messages, the Soviets were able to create a situa-
tion in which their public threat system would appear
to be the cause of the forthcoming cease-fire; the US
would be forced to carry out the arm-twisting of its
own allies outside the public eye if the alliance were

---

[23] Ibid.

to survive at all. The Soviets, while actually risking little, publicly would appear to be risking a great deal in the cause of peace, while the US could be exposed as a hypocritical actor willing to jeopardize world peace rather than take action against its own aberrant allies. The draft resolution and the letter to Eisenhower therefore laid the groundwork for what was to come. The letter to Eisenhower was being broadcast from Moscow as Shepilov was handing it to Ambassador Charles Bohlen for transmission to Washington.[24] Thus the USSR's willingness to commit itself militarily to the defense of Egypt and its plea for American cooperation would now be matters of public record--as would be the American refusal. The lesson would not be lost on the Arab masses: when it came right down to it, the US would not support its words with actions; only the Soviet Union could be depended upon for support in a crunch.

These first two messages helped to undermine the US position as a defender of the rule of law, but the Soviets had a more ticklish task. Their risky plan would only work if events fell into place within a rather precise time frame. To reap full propaganda and

---

[24]Love, p. 614.

prestige value from their forthcoming threats, the Soviets needed American behind the scenes pressure to effect a cease-fire _after_ public announcement of Soviet threats, but _before_ a UNEF could be constituted and inserted between the combatants. This called for delicate timing. That the subsequent order of events conformed to this pattern is a tribute either to Nikita Khrushchev's political acumen or to his luck.

Bringing forth the spectre of a wider war, alluding to possible Soviet military intervention, and associating nuclear weapons with the Suez Crisis were all steps calculated to increase American pressure on her allies. The next step was to publicly (but ambiguously) threaten the colluders with Soviet reprisals if a cease-fire were not forthcoming. The messages to Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion that were broadcast from Moscow at 0100 6 November served this latter function. Any actions taken by the colluding powers after receipt of the Soviet notes would be interpreted, at least by the Arabs, as response to those notes.

The notes to Eden and Mollet expressed essentially the same thoughts, though the wording of the two notes differed slightly. The notes cited the danger to peace and the possibility that continued hostilities

would lead to a wider war or World War III. Bulganin
called upon Britain to "stop the war in Egypt" and
France to "stop aggression and to stop the bloodshed."
Both messages cited the determination of the Soviet
Union to use force to "crush the aggressors and to
restore peace in the East." The portion of the notes
that has spurred the most speculation are the ambiguous
allusions to Soviet rockets. The note to Eden contained
the following passage:

> In what position would Britain have found
> herself had she been attacked by more powerful
> states possessing all types of modern weapons
> of destruction? Indeed, such countries,
> instead of sending to the shores of Britain
> their naval or air force, could have used
> other means, as, for instance, rocket equip-
> ment.
> If rocket weapons had been used against
> Britain and France, you would have certainly
> called it a barbaric action. Yet, what is
> the difference between the inhuman attack
> perpetrated by the armed forces of Britain
> and France against almost-unarmed Egypt.[25]

The following passage is contained in the note
to Mollet:

> What would be the position of France had
> she been attacked by other states which have
> at their disposal the modern terrible means
> of destruction?[26]

---

[25]Text as broadcast by Soviet Home Service, 2145
5 November 1956, cited in United States Policy, p. 184.

[26]Text as broadcast by Soviet Home Service, 2155
5 November 1956, cited in United States Policy, p. 186.

The note from Bulganin to Ben-Gurion differed from the preceding notes in both style and content. Common elements were the citing of the threat to peace and the demand to "halt its military operations against Egypt." But there the similarity ended. The very existence of the Israeli state was seemingly threatened:

> Carrying out the will of other people,
> acting according to instructions from abroad,
> the Government of Israel is playing with the
> fate of peace, with the fate of its own people,
> in a criminal and irresponsible manner; it is
> sowing hatred for the State of Israel among
> the peoples of the East which cannot but affect
> the future of Israel and which will place a
> question upon the very existence of Israel as
> a state.[27]

Unlike the notes to Eden and Mollet, the note to Ben-Gurion cited specific action to be taken by the Soviet Union, i.e., the recalling of the Soviet ambassador at Tel Aviv.

Significantly, the appeal to Ben-Gurion ended with the hope that "the Government of Israel will duly understand and appreciate our warning."[28] In contrast, the note to Eden was closed with the hope that "at this critical moment you will show due prudence and draw corresponding conclusions from this." Similarly, the note to Mollet ended with the hope that "at this

---

[27]Text as broadcast by Soviet Home Service, 2200 5 November 1956, cited in United States Policy, p. 187.

[28]Ibid. Emphasis added.

decisive moment the French Government will show sober-

ness in the evaluation of the situation which has

arisen, and will draw the corresponding conclusions

from it." Thus the implication is that Israel must

terminate its aggression in direct response to an

explicit Soviet warning, while the notes to Britain

and France did not explicitly refer to themselves as

"warnings." The Soviet Union was merely pointing out

to the latter two countries that the "structure of the

developing situation" dictated that they cease hostili-

ties.[29]

Now that the critical components of the five

messages constituting the threat system have been

presented, some general observations can be made.

None of the threats constituted an ultimatum.

For the most part, declaration of a cease-fire was

understood to be the demand, and this was as much

implicit in the structure of the situation as in the

---

[29]"Significant nonverbal communication may
emerge from the structure of the developing situation.
Therefore, analysis of coercive diplomacy cannot be
restricted to the verbal communications that the defend-
ing power transmits to the opponent. Coercive per-
suasion depends not merely on whether the defending
power includes all three components of a classical
ultimatum in its verbal messages to the opponent. The
structure of the situation as it develops and is
expected to develop must also be taken into account.
See George, Hall, and Simons, pp. 29-30.

Soviet notes. Only the note to Israel specified with-
drawal of troops from Egypt.

Definition of the sanction provides the means
by which the notes can be most significantly differ-
entiated. Shepilov's cable to the President of the
Security Council and Bulganin's note to Eisenhower
(subject to interpretation) specified military inter-
vention under the umbrella of a UNSC resolution. The
notes to Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion specified no
particular sanction, but raised the spectres of both
nuclear rocket attack on Britain and France and of
direct and unilateral Soviet military intervention in
Egypt. The note to Israel seemed to threaten that
country's very existence. Because of internal ambigui-
ties and directly conflicting vague sanctions, the over-
all effect of the threat system was to create the
understanding that a cease-fire constituted the demand,
but that the sanction was totally ambiguous.[30]

_____

[30]Hans Speier presents an interesting interpre-
tation of the wide range of severity of sanctions
implied in the threat system: "The less severe threats
controlled the fantasies aroused by the more severe
ones, while the more severe ones, in turn, increased the
intensity of the less severe. In addition, the lashing
verbal aggressiveness of the severe threats was accom-
panied or followed by cautious efforts to prevent
undesirable reactions on the part of the threatened
powers. The doctrine of this procedure may be stated as
follows: In order to exact compliance with an effort at
blackmail, the cost of failing to comply must appear

Of great interest is the fact that the least frightening sanction, multilateral UN intervention, was the most explicitly expressed; the most frightening sanction, nuclear attack on Britain and France, was expressed the most ambiguously. Obviously more information is required before the threat system and the true intention behind it can be correctly interpreted. The next section will detail the extent of Soviet involvement in the Suez Crisis prior to the issuance of the threats.

Soviet Actions as an Index of Resolve

Diplomacy and Propaganda

From nationalization through the two London Conferences and the UN debates, the Soviet Union consistently backed Nasser's position. Shepilov defended Nasser's right to nationalize the canal and warned the Western powers not to use force, since aggression on their part might lead to "a serious conflict which would encompass the whole of the Near and Middle East and

---

disastrously high to the victim. But once fantasies of disaster are aroused, they must be controlled. When they are once aroused, the relatively lesser cost of compliance appears a blessing." See Hans Speier, Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp. RM-1837, [1956]), pp. 33-34.

perhaps go even further."[31] When European canal pilots
left their jobs on 15 September in a bid to demonstrate
Egypt's inability to keep the waterway open, Moscow
dispatched a number of Soviet and satellite pilots to
help fill the gap. The Soviet Union consistently
refused to differentiate between the positions of the
US, Britain, and France. SCUA, which was seen in such
different lights by Dulles and Eden, was simply an
"imperialist plot" to the Soviets.[32]

In the tense weeks between the failure of the
second London Conference and the outbreak of hostili-
ties, the Soviet press took note of Israel's obvious
military preparations and speculated on the prospect of
collusion:

> As the Soviet press has already pointed out,
> the aggressive actions of Israeli extremists are
> directly linked with the Suez crisis, which is
> viewed by Israeli ruling circles in a very
> unpeaceful light. It is being openly hoped in
> Israel that the Western powers will use military
> force against Egypt, and there is a widespread
> opinion in certain Israeli political circles
> that any military action on the part of the West
> must be preceded or accompanied by Israeli
> military operations.[33]

---

[31]Pravda, 18 August 1956, cited by O. M.
Smolansky, "Moscow and the Suez Crisis, 1956: A
Reappraisal," Political Science Quarterly 80 (December
1965): 584.

[32]Pravda, 22 September 1956, cited by Smolansky,
p. 585.

[33]Izvestia, 14 October 1956, cited in Current

The first two days of November, after the
Israeli attack was fully formed, after the Anglo-French
ultimatum had been delivered, and after the Egyptian
Air Force had been destroyed on the ground by British
and French air attacks, published Soviet statements
condemned the attack, but there was no hint of military
intervention.

A page one Pravda and Izvestia story on 1
November charged that "the invasion of the Israeli
troops was obviously designed as a pretext for the
Western powers, primarily Britain and France, to move
their troops onto the territory of the Arab states,
particularly the Suez Canal Zone." The story included
the following rather formal and diplomatically worded
admonition:

> The Soviet government considers that full
> responsibility for the dangerous consequences
> which may result from these aggressive actions
> against Egypt rests with the governments that
> have embarked on the path of violating peace
> and security, the path of aggression.[34]

The Soviet press, reflecting the official
position of the government, continued in the early days
of November to denounce the aggression and to call for

Digest of the Soviet Press 8 (21 November 1956): 22
(hereafter cited as CDSP).

[34] CDSP 8 (12 December 1956): 21.

UN Security Council action. Additionally, it was reported that Bulganin had called upon Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India to call an emergency session of the neutralist Bandung Conference participants. Presidium Chairman K. E. Voroshilov sent a similar letter to Indonesian President Sukarno.[35]

There was no hint of Soviet military intervention until the first of the threatening messages was broadcast on the evening of 5 November. Syrian President Shukri al-Kuwatly, in Moscow on an official visit, asked Khrushchev, Council of Ministers Chairman Bulganin, and Defense Minister Marshal G. K. Zhukov if they could intervene:

> Zhukov then unfolded a map in front of him and said: "Mr. President, here is the map, look at it, how can we intervene?" Kuwatly . . . leaped from his chair and cried: "Marshal Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov, do you want me, a poor civilian to tell you, the star of World War Two, how to intervene? You must intervene." They tried to calm Kuwatly, talking about the impossibility of military intervention and how they would have to use political means and act through the United Nations. . . . [Kuwatly] was near to tears with rage and frustration.[36]

---

[35]Pravda editorial, 2 November 1956, cited in CDSP 8 (12 December 1956): 22.

[36]Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo Documents (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), p. 112. In judging the authenticity of the reported conversation, it must be remembered that Heikal, editor of Al Ahram, was a close friend and supporter of Nasser. Also, The

Therefore, evidence supplied by Soviet press statements and published diplomatic papers shows no intent to apply pressure on Britain, France, or Israel by other than diplomatic means.

Actions of Soviet Military
Personnel Caught in Egypt

Forty Il-28 light jet bombers recently delivered under the Czechoslovakian arms deal were the most formidable offensive weapons available to the Egyptians. Israeli concern over the threat these aircraft posed to their cities abated only when the French guaranteed to provide air cover over Israel's urban areas. Embarrassingly enough, most of the Egyptian aircrews for these aircraft were in the Soviet Union for training, and the Il-28s in Egypt were being operated by Soviet and/or East European personnel. Faced with the unpleasant choice between watching its expensive aircraft share the fate of the rest of the Egyptian Air Force or flying Soviet aircrews on combat missions against NATO-nation forces, "Moscow's immediate choice . . . was to regard discretion as the better part of valor and quietly to evacuate the most valuable items of Soviet military

Cairo Documents was published after relations with Moscow had cooled.

equipment and the majority of the Russian experts."[37] The bombers were flown out under cover of darkness to airfields in Syria and Saudia Arabia.[38] Assuming the Egyptian Air Force had some capability to operate a number of the Il-28s themselves, the Soviet action in withdrawing all the aircraft (some were caught by air attacks before they could be evacuated) crippled the long-range offensive capability of Egypt.[39]

As the decision to evacuate the Il-28s was made shortly after the first air attacks began, it provides an index of Soviet intent early in the crisis. The apparent conclusion is that Moscow was interested in protecting its economic investment and ensuring the noninvolvement of Soviet military personnel.

Actions of the Soviet Consul
in Port Said

One of the many unresolved questions of fact associated with the Suez Crisis revolves around the role of Anatoly Tchikov, the Soviet consul in Port Said.

---

[37]Ra'anan, pp. 169-70.

[38]William Green and John Fricker, The Air Forces of the World (New York: Hanover House, 1958), p. 285.

[39]Interview with John Erickson, in Anthony Moncrieff, ed., Suez: Ten Years After (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), p. 49.

Historians are unanimous in reporting the uneasy de facto cease-fire that reigned in Port Said from 1730 to 2230 on 5 November. It is also generally accepted that during the cease-fire loudspeaker vans toured the city inciting the recently armed people to continue the resistance. The will of the people to resist was bolstered by reports that Paris and London would be destroyed that night by Russian missiles.[40]

Historians diverge on the question of Tchikov's role in instigating the broadcasts. Merry and Serge Bromberger, French correspondents in Port Said covering the invasion, reported that Tchikov played an instrumental role in distributing arms to the civil population and in mobilizing the loudspeaker trucks with their cheery message that World War III was at hand. In contrast, Kennett Love reports that Tchikov played no meaningful role and that the myth of his activism originated with hearsay and conjecture by one or two high-level allied officers, perpetuated through plagiarism from one book to another. Love reported that Salahedden Moguy, commander of the Egyptian forces at Port Said, ordered the loudspeaker trucks into the

---

[40]Love, pp. 608-9; Thomas, p. 145; also Merry Bromberger and Serge Bromberger, Secrets of Suez (London: Pan Books, 1957), p. 145.

streets himself. The truck crews were instructed to
"say whatever you like but raise morale." Moguy told
Love that the idea of announcing Russian aid came from
the truck crews.[41]

Whatever Tchikov's role, the significance of
the truck broadcasts (the content of which is not in
dispute) is that they reflect the popular perception
that the USSR was a rallying point and a superpower
protector against the imperialist world. Soviet
diplomacy and propaganda aimed at the Arab states since
the Twentieth Party Congress had been effective. Though
Nasser continued to suppress indigenous Communism, the
Egyptian masses were able to see the Soviet Union as a
friend and benefactor.

Protests in Moscow and Soviet Public Opinion

There is no evidence of any spontaneous swelling
of Soviet public opinion in support of Egypt. Other
than contrived and formalistic condemnations of the
aggressors by various interest groups, there was a total
absence of public clamor until carefully orchestrated
protest demonstrations occurred in front of the French,
British, and Israeli Embassies on 5-6 November.

---

[41]Love, p. 609.

Sir William Hayter, the English ambassador in Moscow, reported that demonstrations on 5 November were "small and rather ineffective." However, the next day, following the previous evening's broadcast of the Russian threats, "swarms of Russians" began to arrive in front of the British Embassy. They invaded the Embassy courtyard and garden, but police guards posted between the inner and outer doors made sure they did not get into the building itself.

> The crowd was on the whole orderly and good-tempered; they were overheard to praise the garden; when they saw anyone at a window they varied between cheerful greetings and rather unconvincing fist-shaking; they peered into the windows and climbed the walls, pinning on to them illiterate slogans such as "Begone away from Egypt" or "Hands off from Egypt."[42]

Hayter was convinced of the "synthetic nature" of the demonstrations.

In summary, available evidence indicates there was no great public indignation expressed until 5 November even though France and Britain had been bombing Egypt since 31 October. When protests did occur, they were most likely arranged by the government. Therefore, the timing of the protests, if not their lackadaisical content, is a valid index of the position

---

[42]Sir William Hayter, The Kremlin and the Embassy (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 150.

of the Soviet government. In this respect, the dominant pattern begins to emerge: the Kremlin was extremely wary of committing itself until the evening of 5 November, eight days after the beginning of the Israeli attack through the Sinai and six days after Anglo-French military operations had begun.

The Question of Soviet Volunteers

Khrushchev broached the subject of Soviet citizens volunteering for service in Egypt on 23 August 1956 at the Rumanian Embassy. The remark went unreported by the Soviet press until 6 November, the day of the cease-fire.[43] Peking Radio announced on the seventh that 250,000 Chinese had asked to join Egypt's forces. Two days later Ali Sabry, Nasser's close political adviser, stated there would be no need for volunteers if Britain, France, and Israel withdrew their forces. Sabry, reflecting Nasser's desire to minimize the Soviet presence, made it clear that Egypt had no wish to accept volunteers at present.[44] However, a TASS

---

[43]Bruce D. Hamlett, "A Comparative Analysis of British Foreign Relations" (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1970), pp. 174-75; also Yaacov Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement; A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), p. 182.

[44]Facts on File 16 (7-13 November 1956): 374.

statement on 11 November indicated the Soviet Union was still in the business of reaping propaganda benefit at little risk:

> The ardent sympathy of Soviet people for the Egyptian people, as well as for the other peoples of the East fighting for their national independence and freedom is vividly expressed in the numerous applications of Soviet citizens, including a large number of airmen, tank troops, artillery men on reserve and officers who took part in the great patriotic war, requesting that they be allowed to go to Egypt as volunteers to fight with the Egyptian people to drive the aggressors from Egyptian soil. . . . If Britain, France and Israel fail to withdraw their forces . . . the appropriate agencies in the Soviet Union will not prevent the departure of Soviet citizens--volunteers--who wish to take part in the struggle of the Egyptian people for their independence. [45]

At a 14 November press conference Eisenhower said it would be the duty of the UN, which would include the US, to oppose efforts to send volunteers to the Middle East, and that the UN was "not in any manner of means limited to resolutions." [46] Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., told the General Assembly two days later that introduction of external forces would be a threat to the UNEF. After the American statements, Soviet newspapers abruptly dropped all mention of the drive to enlist volunteers. Egyptian

---

[45] Pravda and Izvestia, 11 November 1956, cited in CDSP 8 (19 December 1956): 26.

[46] Facts on File 16 (14-20 November 1956): 385.

diplomats reported that Soviet volunteers had stopped applying at the Egyptian Embassy in Moscow.[47]   On 19 November Nasser said there were no Soviet volunteers in Egypt and that none had been requested from any country. Having borne the brunt of the Western military incursion without material help from the outside, Nasser was determined not to succumb to a more insidious threat. On 8 December TASS stated that British, French, and Israeli withdrawal from Egypt "naturally cancels the question of dispatching Soviet volunteers for Egypt."[48]

In summary, the timing of Soviet threats to send volunteers to Egypt indicates only overwhelming caution in matters leading to physical Soviet intervention. That talk of volunteers did not reach serious proportions until after the cease-fire indicates that propaganda value, rather than military pressure, was the primary motive.

Why Were the Threats Delayed?

The timing of the Soviet threat system is a valid index of Soviet resolve to employ military force in order to secure a cease-fire in Egypt. The most

---

[47]Ibid.

[48]Facts on File 16 (5-11 December 1956): 411.

revealing statement concerning the effect of timing came

from the Israeli Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan:

> It is perhaps just as well that owing to the
> situation in Hungary, Russia's threatening
> messages were delayed until this date, the night
> of 5 November, twelve hours after the last shot
> was fired in Operation "Kadesh" [the assault on
> Sharm al-Sheikh]. Who knows whether this Sinai
> Campaign would have been launched if the Russian
> messages had been sent to Britain, France, and
> Israel before the 29th of October.[49]

Dayan attributed the delay in the threats to

the fact that the Soviets were too preoccupied in

Hungary to commit themselves in any material way to the

defense of Egypt. This hypothesis is readily support-

able by examining the chronology of Soviet involvement

in Hungary. On 22 October Hungarian dissidents began

to demand reforms, inspired by the recent Polish

successes. Russian tanks entered Budapest two days

later, ostensibly invited by former Premier Imre Nagy,

though he later denied it. On 30 October it appeared

as if the Hungarian rebels had won the day; moderate

reforms were announced and the Red Army prepared to

withdraw from Budapest. When it appeared that Nagy,

reinstated as Premier, was losing control to forces

demanding an independent and neutral Hungary, a debate

within the Kremlin leadership ensued on whether or not

---

[49]Dayan, p. 186.

to intervene in force. The hard liners won, and on 4 November 200,000 Russian troops and 4,000 tanks moved into Budapest to reestablish Moscow's control over its errant satellite. The Red Army broke the back of the revolution quickly, and Party First Secretary Janos Kadar fled to the Yugoslav Embassy around noon. Thus the Soviet Union was not sufficiently secure in its position in Hungary until late on 4 November to be able to take the diplomatic initiative in the Middle East.

Two events following closely on the heels of the successful Hungarian intervention reduced the risks inherent in a strong Suez initiative.

The first of these was the clarification of the American position with respect to its allies. Until 4 November, American efforts to obtain a Suez cease-fire were either thwarted in the UN by Britain and France or ignored. "Could the United States have been playing the game at which the Russians themselves excelled-- talk much, do little?"[50] Before the Soviets could make a decisive move, they had to know the answer. Henry Cabot Lodge gave them the answer in his vehement support of Lester Pearson's plan for the establishment of a UN Emergency Force. The British representative, Sir

---

[50] Smolansky, p. 592.

Pierson Dixon, attempted to delay the vote on the resolution, but "Lodge, with uplifted arms and admonitory gestures, would brook no delay."[51] The resolution establishing the UNEF was adopted by 57 to 0 at 0030 5 November. Lodge promised American support for the UNEF in the form of aircraft, shipping, transport, and supplies. The American position against its allies was cast in concrete. For the first time, "the Soviet Union could speak boldly and carry a big stick without taking any appreciable risks."[52]

One final event minimized the risk of the forthcoming Soviet initiatives--the surrender of Sharm al-Sheikh at 0930 5 November. The collapse of Egyptian resistance in the Sinai and the cease-fire that immediately ensued between Egypt and Israel relegated the vituperative note to Ben-Gurion to an academic role. At 0146 6 November Ben-Gurion cabled Abba Eban in New York:

> Inform Secretary General immediately that Israel agrees unconditionally to cease fire. Since this morning 5 November all fighting has ceased between Israel and Egyptian forces on land, sea and air and full quiet prevails.[53]

---

[51]Finer, p. 407.

[52]Smolansky, loc. cit.

[53]UN document A/3301, cited in United States Policy, p. 178.

The Sinai cease-fire, besides eliminating all
risk that the Soviet threat to Israel would have to be
fulfilled, completely undermined the already thin
pretext for the Anglo-French landings. The British
and French at this point could only lamely assert that
the purpose of the landings was to station troops
"between the combatants" pending the arrival of the
UNEF.

With the Hungarian situation under control, with
the US unequivocably opposing its allies at every turn,
with overwhelming world condemnation of the colluders
expressed at the UN, with Eden in failing health and
beset by constant opposition at home by both his own
Tories and Hugh Gaitskell's Laborites, it was easy to
foresee the quick collapse of the Anglo-French military
adventure. The remaining task for the Soviet leaders
was to take advantage of that imminent collapse through
diplomatic moves which would present the appearance of
being both risky and decisive.

How the Threats Were Perceived

Great Britain

Prime Minister Eden "considered that the threats
in Marshal Bulganin's note need not be taken literally."
Of all the pressures on him, he cited the Sinai

---

cease-fire as the most prominent determinant of his subsequent decision:

> We had intervened to divide and, above all, to contain the conflict. The occasion for our intervention was over, the fire was out. Once the fighting had ceased, justification for further intervention ceased with it.[54]

Eden's Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Kilmuir, who remained "unrepentant" on Suez, agreed with Eden's evaluation of the Russian threat, stating that "the threats from the Russians of bombing London and sending 'volunteers' to Egypt had no effect on us, and, indeed, the Russian bluster was curiously half-hearted."[55] Kilmuir discounted the threat to the pound, the effect of public opinion, and the "vitriolic frenzy of the Opposition," citing instead the decision of the UN to take responsibility as the prime factor in Eden's order to cease-fire.

More balanced views are presented by British statesmen not so closely identified with Eden's policies. Sir William Hayter, who was awakened in the middle of the night in Moscow to receive the threatening message, stated:

---

[54] Eden, p. 200.

[55] David Kilmuir, Political Adventure: The Memoirs of the Earl of Kilmuir (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 280.

> It is clear enough from its text that its
> intention was not to persuade the Prime
> Minister but to put pressure on him, or at
> least to appear to be doing so. . . . Per-
> sonally I later came to believe that this
> decision was taken on other grounds, and
> moreover that the Russians when they sent
> their letter knew that our collapse was
> inevitable and imminent and cashed in on
> this by delivering threats they were sure
> they would never have to carry out, thus
> enabling themselves to pose as the saviours
> of the Arabs.[56]

Anthony Nutting cited the decisive influence of
political and economic pressures, stoppage of Middle
East oil shipments, the run on the pound, American
pressure, hostility of the Commonwealth, and condemna-
tion from the British press as the major reasons why
Eden had to arrange a cease-fire. Nutting discounted
the importance of the Russian threats, claiming their
purpose was to provide a means by which the Russians
could "pose as champions of the Arabs and gain
credence throughout the Middle East for their claim to
have stopped the Anglo-French aggression against
Egypt."[57]

If memoirs can be believed, the British paid
little heed to the Russian threat. Eden's reply to
Bulganin on 6 November noted that in light of the

---

[56]Hayter, pp. 146-47.

[57]Nutting, pp. 144-45.

Soviet Union's activities in Hungary, it "ill-becomes the Soviet Government to speak of the actions of Her Majesty's Government as 'barbaric.'"[58] However, from a historical viewpoint, the threat of nuclear attack on Great Britain left a lasting impression, regardless of how incredible it was considered at the time. The British were frustrated because of their inability to counter the Soviet threats militarily. A corollary of that frustration was reliance on American strategic power. The point was brought home most forcefully that Britain had slipped from the first rank of world powers. Harold Macmillan succeeded Eden as Prime Minister in January 1957 and established the restoration of Anglo-American relations as a primary goal. He resisted conservative pressure for establishment of an independent nuclear force and in fact drew closer to the American deterrent. Arrangements were made for 60 Thor IRBMs to be stationed in Britain under a two-key system.[59]

Randolph Churchill, before the American Chamber

---

[58]Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 559 (1956): 76-77, cited in United States Policy, p. 199.

[59]Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 140.

of Commerce in London in late 1958, stated:

> Britain can knock down twelve cities in the
> region of Stalingrad and Moscow from bases in
> Britain and another dozen in the Crimea from
> bases in Cyprus. We did not have that power
> at the time of Suez. We are a major power
> again.[60]

Implicit in Churchill's statement was that the
Soviet nuclear threat was a factor in the cease-fire
decision, and by gaining a minimal deterrent force of
her own, Britain would reduce her vulnerability to that
sort of pressure.

France

France's reaction to the Soviet threat was more
complex than Britain's. Unlike the pound, the franc
was in good shape. The French Prime Minister was not
subject to the intense criticism that Eden received
from Parliament. Thus, the French Cabinet, under fewer
pressures, was sharply divided as to whether to continue
military operations even after the British had quit.

Guy Mollet was concerned enough about Bulganin's
note to have awakened the American ambassador, Douglas
Dillon, at 0130 and summon him to the Matignon. Dillon
assured Mollet that the US would retaliate after a

---

[60]Times (London), 14 November 1958, cited by
William P. Snyder, The Politics of British Defense
Policy 1945-1962 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University
Press, 1964), p. 233.

Soviet missile attack on Britain or France. Mollet

wanted additional assurance about what the American

response would be to a Soviet attack on Anglo-French

forces in the Middle East, but an unambiguous answer to

this question was never received.[61] While Dillon and

Mollet were conferring, Eden called to announce his

decision to declare a cease-fire. Mollet told Dillon

the French would have to stop also. When the French

Cabinet met on the evening of the sixth to confirm

Mollet's decision, opinion was split. Foreign Minister

Christian Pineau and Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-

Maunoury, evidently totally unimpressed by the Russian

threats,[62] wanted to continue the operation independent

of the British. They argued that once Britain quit,

Israel would be released from her Sèvres pledge not to

cross the canal and could join forces with the French.

In the end, the Cabinet dissenters were swayed by three

practical problems: (1) the difficulty of disengaging

French elements from the combined Anglo-French force;

(2) the necessity to fight their way through pacified

---

[61]Finer, p. 432.

[62]Pineau says he never believed the rockets
posed a serious threat. Christian Pineau, L'operation
de Suez, p. 4, cited by Anne K. Davis, "Sir Anthony
Eden's Response to the Nationalization of the Suez
Canal" (Master's thesis, San Diego State College, 1969),
p. 113.

British military units that held positions south of the French; and (3) the prospect of operating without the protection of British carrier-borne fighter aircraft in the event Russian air support materialized.

The news of the cease-fire hit General André Beaufre, commander of the French forces, "like a blow in the pit of the stomach." Beaufre considered disobeying the cease-fire order and continuing south on his own authority:

> My mind was eventually made up by the existence of this Soviet "ultimatum," the terms of which I did not know; in these circumstances, I decided, I had no right to take so grave an initiative. . . . So I decided to carry out the order received.[63]

In historical perspective, the French felt they were forced to discontinue a potentially successful military operation because their lack of an independent nuclear force subordinated them to the aims of American foreign policy. Thus, Suez played a significant role in the genesis of de Gaulle's force de dissuasion.[64] The

---

[63]André Beaufre, The Suez Expedition 1956 (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 118. Beaufre had not heard the broadcast of the Soviet message, which was described to him by another officer as a Soviet ultimatum.

[64]Edward L. Morse, Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 152-53; also Wilfrid Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 36.

lesson was learned: the existence of nuclear weapons was coming into the fore as a prime diplomatic means of coercing one's friends as well as one's enemies.

Israel

Bulganin's note to Ben-Gurion was of more academic than operational interest, since all fighting between Israeli and Egyptian forces had halted with the capture of Sharm al-Sheikh. Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion was infuriated by the difference in tone and content between the note to himself and the ones to Eden and Mollet. In his reply to Bulganin, Ben-Gurion noted that Israel had stopped fighting in response to the General Assembly appeal. He further stated:

> Our foreign policy is dictated by our vital
> needs and our thirst for peace. It is not and
> will not be decided by any outside forces. As
> a sovereign state we choose our own path.[65]

As Moshe Dayan said, the effect of the threats might have been radically different had they been delivered earlier. Israel, outside the protection of NATO, would have been particularly vulnerable to direct Soviet intervention.[66]

---

[65]Pravda and Izvestia, 16 November 1956, cited in CDSP 8 (26 December 1956): 24.

[66]Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, the Armed Prophet (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 231.

United States

     Upon receipt of Bulganin's note proposing joint US-Soviet intervention, Eisenhower immediately replied that the letter was "an obvious attempt to divert world attention from the Hungarian tragedy." The suggestion of joint force outside UN auspices was "unthinkable."[67]

     Sources diverge as to how much impact the threat system had on Eisenhower and his advisers. In an interview conducted some years after Suez, Eisenhower discounted the threat's impact:

> As usual, the Russian, when he threatens, he is trying to bulldoze you a little bit. . . . Long ago Foster and I had come to the conviction that the last thing that the Russians wanted was a war, a global war. . . . Every place they were threatening and the Communists were making noises, the Russians were always very careful not to use their own troops. So we were just perfectly certain that they didn't want to go to war. Of course, neither did we. But we were not the ones making threats around the world and so we just told them that this would be, well, we just told them, really it would be global war if they started it, that's all. . . . We didn't even, as I remember it, consult with Defense or anything else.[68]

     In contrast, Herman Finer reported that

---

[67]White House News Release, 5 November 1956, cited in United States Policy, p. 182.

[68]Love, pp. 614-15. At the very least, Eisenhower did in fact consult with the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Eisenhower and his advisers "were all terrified!"[69]

In retrospect, the actual effect of the Soviet threat system on Washington probably lay somewhere between the reported extremes of nonchalance and stark terror.[70]

Eisenhower's initial reaction was to seek information. On the morning of 6 November U-2s were ordered into the air over Syria to watch for possible deployments of Soviet aircraft into Syrian staging bases. Eisenhower decided to keep to his schedule, driving to Gettysburg to vote and returning in the late afternoon to watch the election returns. Half an hour after he left, CIA chief Allen Dulles telephoned Sherman Adams at the White House and said new intelligence had come in from Turkey that indicated the Soviets might be undertaking a military initiative in the Middle East. Eisenhower was summoned back to the White House shortly after noon, and a meeting of the military chiefs and the

_____

[69]Finer, p. 417.

[70]Reading between the lines brings one to this conclusion. Eisenhower's reminisces, afforded the advantage of hindsight, very likely succumbed to the natural tendency to discount the effect of hostile foreign initiatives on one's own policy process. Herman Finer's statement must be viewed in the light of the tendentious nature of his entire book. His overall thesis is that Eisenhower and Dulles, rather than being cowed by Russian threats, should have supported our allies at a critical time.

215

National Security Council took place. The CIA's
estimate of Soviet intentions became calmer after the
initial reports of Soviet activity were disconfirmed.[71]

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chief of Naval
Operations, recommended taking some precautionary
military measures as long as there was any question of
Soviet intent. Eisenhower agreed, and the Continental
Air Defense Command, Sixth Fleet, Atlantic Fleet, and
Strategic Air Command were alerted.[72]

The most significant effect of the Soviet
threats was to raise the spectre of direct Soviet
military intervention in the Middle East. Though not
directly threatened, the United States was every bit a
target of the Soviet threats as were Britain, France,
and Israel. Khrushchev, the guiding force behind the
threats that emerged under others' signatures, knew he

---

[71]Speier, p. 39. Soviet troop movements in
Eastern Europe were reinterpreted as measures to seal
Hungary's borders. High flying jets over Turkey turned
out to be scheduled Soviet MiG deliveries to Syria. An
RAF Canberra supposedly shot down at 45,000 feet over
Syria by a MiG turned out to have been downed by a Syrian
Meteor jet fighter at low altitude. Reports of Russian
frogmen at Alexandria and Soviet requests to send war
ships and submarines through the Dardanelles were never
confirmed. See Love, p. 615; Finer, p. 421; also
Charles J. V. Murphy, "Washington and the World,"
Fortune 55 (January 1957): 81-83.

[72]Speier, p. 38.

could not begin to threaten the US directly because of
the decisive American strategic superiority. However,
that did not mean the US was totally incapable of
perceiving threat. Soviet military presence in the
Middle East, whether under UN auspices or unilateral
initiative, would have proved disastrous to every
American foreign policy goal in that area of the world.
The Baghdad Pact and "northern tier" concept would have
been totally undermined. Once Soviet forces had been
introduced into Egypt in any capacity, they would
undoubtedly demonstrate a tenacious ability to remain.
Through Egypt, the Soviets would gain access to the
Mediterranean and Arab Africa. The prospects for a
wider war, as the threat messages correctly pointed out,
would have been greatly enhanced because any forthcoming
Soviet presence would have to be balanced by American
forces if that area of the world were not to be written
off by the West. The ambiguous allusions to nuclear
weapons that appeared in three of the five messages
were not really there to threaten; they were there to
remind the US that the stakes of this particular game
could go higher.

The threat system effectively mobilized Schell-
ing's strategy of mutual and shared risk. Obviously, the
Soviet Union would stand to lose as much from military

confrontation as the United States; but the US, by
pressuring its allies to effect a cease-fire, could
take the first step to reduce the probability that such
a confrontation would ever take place. Khrushchev had
one additional factor going for him: increased American
pressure on Britain and France would not be inconsistent
with established American policy. By the time the
threat system was operating, the US was already placing
an extraordinary amount of diplomatic pressure on its
own allies. By mobilizing the risk of a wider war,
Khrushchev was apparently hoping American pressure would
be channeled into a more incontrovertible and decisive
mode. It was.

American economic pressure on Great Britain was
the decisive factor in bringing about the cease-fire.
Eden considered the run on the pound "a more formidable
threat than Marshal Bulganin's." British dollar
reserves fell by $57 million in September, $84 million
in October, and $279 million in November, with the latter
figure representing about 15 percent of their total
dollar reserves. Eden said, "This was a gloomy fore-
boding and could have been decisive within the next few
days [after 5 November]."[73] In actuality it was decisive

---

[73]Eden, pp. 201-2; also Moncrieff, p. 25.

immediately. At the critical morning Cabinet meeting

on 6 November, Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold

Macmillan, long a supporter of Eden's Suez policy,

announced that he could "not any more be responsible for

Her Majesty's Exchequer" unless there was a cease-fire [74]

The fate of the pound had been tied to a cease-fire by

an American promise to back an International Monetary

Fund (IMF) loan only if a cease-fire were forthcoming

by midnight. [75] The cease-fire did go into effect at

midnight GMT, and the pound was saved, partly by the

mere news of the American credits. On Friday 7 December

the House of Commons endorsed the withdrawal of British

troops from Port Said. The following Monday the IMF

announced it would release up to $1.3 billion to bolster

British dollar and gold reserves and to ensure the value

of the pound. [76] On 21 December, in anticipation of the

completion of the Anglo-French evacuation of Port Said

---

[74]Thomas, p. 149, cited as "evidence of a
Minister."

[75]Ibid., p. 150, cited as "evidence of a junior
Minister." The vehicle of the American pressure was a
telephoned plea by R. A. Butler, Leader of the House of
Commons, to his close personal friend, US Treasury Secre-
tary George Humphrey. Humphrey at that time made Ameri-
can financial help contingent upon a midnight cease-fire.
See Love, p. 625, citing testimony of a Cabinet Minister.

[76]Facts on File 16 (5-11 December 1956): 410.

the next day, the US Export-Import Bank offered Britain $500 million in credits for purchases in the US, to include much-needed oil.[77]

The ambiguous threat system, ostensively directed against Britain, France, and Israel, acted so as to threaten American foreign policy interests in the Middle East. The Soviet threats persuaded Eisenhower to put decisive pressure on an already wavering Eden. The French, though inclined to proceed without the British, were not able to do so due to practical considerations. The Soviets were in an ideal diplomatic position to take credit for the cease-fire because disclosure of the actual American role would only embarrass and further weaken the NATO alliance. Moscow, through the judicious use of ambiguity, had turned military weakness into diplomatic strength.

Egypt

Nasser took a realistic view of the Soviet Union's role in bringing about the cease-fire. As early as 8 November, Nasser told the American ambassador, Raymond A. Hare, "Don't worry about these Soviet moves [post cease-fire offers of volunteers]: I don't trust any big

---

[77]Facts on File 16 (19-25 December 1956): 426.

power."[78] Two factors prevented Nasser from radically
changing his prewar opinion of the USSR. First, his
basic attitude towards indigenous Communism had not
changed; second, the obvious delay in the delivery of
the Soviet threats clearly indicated that the Soviet
Union was not prepared to take real risks for the sake
of peripheral interests. On 22 March 1959, at the
height of the Moscow-Cairo split, Nasser noted that it
took nine (actually eight) days for Moscow to make up
its mind.

> We had not the slightest intimation of support
> from any foreign state, even the Soviet Union.
> We relied on God and ourselves. . . . Had it
> not been for our firm stand during those nine
> days, our whole country would have now been
> dominated by imperialism.[79]

Smolansky notes that the Suez Crisis "touched
off a slow process of deterioration in Moscow-Cairo
relations," because Nasser realized that the Soviet
Union was primarily interested in securing its own
interests "and would not hesitate to step on Nasir's
toes should the circumstances so require."[80]

---

[78]Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 97.

[79]UAR Department of Information, President Gamal
Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews, 1959, p.
172, cited by Smolansky, p. 51.

[80]Ibid., p. 53.

The United Arab Republic (UAR) was formed on 1 February 1958 as a means to counter increasing Soviet influence in Syria.[81] Nasser continued to pursue his policy of "positive neutralism" as much to counter Soviet influence as Western imperialism. It may seem paradoxical that the Soviet Union agreed to finance the Aswan High Dam in December 1958 when relations between the two countries were becoming increasingly strained. The explanation lies in a temporary confluence of short-term interests. Egypt required financing for the dam, technical aid, low interest loans, and a stable market for her cotton; the Soviet Union needed to consolidate its position in the UAR in the face of increasing Arab rapprochement with the United States.[82]

Soviet and Egyptian long-term goals continued to diverge, however. Nasser wanted Western influence curbed so that Egypt could attain full independence in its affairs, while Moscow wanted Western influence curbed so that it could be supplanted by Soviet

---

[81]John S. Badeau, "The Soviet Approach to the. Arab World," Orbis 3 (Spring 1959): 78. After the UAR was formed, indigenous Communists were forced to go underground. See Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War; Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 11; also Ro'i, pp. 276-77.

[82]Oles M. Smolansky, "Moscow-Cairo Crisis 1959," Slavic Review 22 (December 1963): 725; also Ro'i, p. 272.

influence.[83] That Nasser was unable to rid himself of
the Soviets in his lifetime is attributable to his
naivite and inability to see how "no strings" arms
deals, economic aid, and trade agreements could serve
as a vehicle for maintaining an influential Soviet
presence in his country.

The Soviet Union

Though the threats went out over the signatures
of Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov and Council of
Ministers Chairman Nikolai Bulganin, they actually
mirrored the political style of one man, Nikita S.
Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communitist
Party.[84] The final emergence of Khrushchev as "undis-
puted and supreme dictator" in the post-Stalin years
was marked by the forced resignation of G. M. Malenkov
and his replacement by Khrushchev's man, Bulganin, in
February 1955.[85]

Khrushchev's memoirs are inconsistent in
describing how the threat system actually brought about

[83]Ibid., p. 726.

[84]Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia
Since World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1971),
p. 257.

[85]Basil Dmytryshyn, USSR; A Concise History
(New York: Scribner's, 1971), pp. 268-69.

the cease-fire and whether the US was a purposeful

target. The following passage discounts the American

role and refers to the direct effect of the threats on

Britain and France:

> The governments of England and France knew per-
> fectly well that Eisenhower's speech condemning
> their aggression was just a gesture for the sake
> of public appearances. But when we delivered our
> own stern warnings to the three aggressors, they
> knew that we weren't playing games with public
> opinion. They took us very seriously. I've been
> told that when Guy Mollet received our note, he
> ran to the telephone in his pajamas and called
> Eden. I don't know if this story is true, but
> whether or not he had his trousers on doesn't
> change the fact that twenty-two hours after the
> delivery of our note the aggression was halted.[86]

Memoirs released later support the interpreta-

tion put forth in this chapter--that the threats were

designed from the outset to prey on American anxieties:

> We took several diplomatic and political steps
> which made it clear that we were committed to
> Egypt. We announced publicly in the press that
> we were recruiting volunteers and advisers to help
> the Egyptian army. That had an immediate effect
> on the boss of the imperialists--that is, on the
> United States--with the result that the Americans
> put pressure on the British, French, and Israelis,
> forcing them to withdraw their troops.[87]

---

[86]Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers,
trans. Strobe Talbott, with Introduction, commentary and
notes by Edward Crankshaw (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970),
p. 436.

[87]Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers;
The Last Testament, trans. Strobe Talbott, with Foreword
by Edward Crankshaw and Introduction by Jerrold L.
Schecter (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 343.

One should not be surprised that the two
accounts differ. Edward Crankshaw defended the
authenticity of Khrushchev's memoirs on the very
grounds that contradictions did occur. Crankshaw noted
that "Khrushchev was a compulsive chatterbox," and that
"his speech was filled with evasions, distortions,
deliberate omissions, contradictions, downright lies."[88]

Khrushchev's personal style is of great
importance. The inconsistencies between the messages
and their internal ambiguities may be explained, at
least in part, by Khrushchev's capriciousness. Stated
differently, if one assumes that Khrushchev was the real
author of the five messages, then their ambiguous
nature does not constitute a departure from Khrushchev's
diplomatic style.

Oleg Penkovskiy, who intensely disliked
Khrushchev, noted that the Soviet military was extremely
uneasy with Khrushchev's "adventurist" diplomatic style.
He reported that the General Staff felt as if they were
"sitting on a powderkeg" during the concurrent
Hungarian and Suez Crises.[89]

---

[88]Ibid., p. vi.

[89]Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers, trans.
Peter Deriabin, with Introduction and commentary by
Frank Gibney and Foreword by Edward Crankshaw (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 212.

Morton Schwarz notes that "the most pronounced incongruencies are associated with the policies of Khrushchev," who was "inconsistent, ambiguous, and vague in his threats and brandishment of Soviet arms that sometimes were something less than operationally deployed."[90]

The ambiguity of the threats was a reflection of Khrushchev's personal motives as well as his style. Khrushchev was the architect of a Soviet strategic deterrence policy based on missile power.[91] He was understandably eager to demonstrate the potential coercive power of Soviet ICBMs to his own skeptical military chiefs. He saw the Suez Crisis as an opportunity to flaunt the newly emerging Soviet missile power under conditions of minimal risk. That the only Soviet missile capable of reaching London from western Russia was still in the operational testing stage[92] was

_____

[90]Morton Schwarz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, Calif.: Dickenson, 1975), p. 181.

[91]Raymond L. Garthoff, "Khrushchev and the Military" in Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases, eds. Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Westin (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 262.

[92]The T-2 (M-103) IRBM could carry a nuclear warhead 1850 miles, but was not operationally deployed until after testing was completed in 1957. See Frederick I. Ordway, III, and Ronald C. Wakeford, International Missile and Spacecraft Guide (New York: McGraw-Hill,

only of incidental importance to Khrushchev.[93] He had
too much to gain domestically by silencing the critics
of his military reforms, and too much to gain inter-
nationally by posing as the champion of the Arab world
and emerging neutralists everywhere.

The Suez threat system may well have been the
opening round in Khrushchev's campaign to revolutionize
Soviet military doctrine in order to take full advantage
of nuclear weapons. Such a move made good sense not
only in strictly military terms, but also in terms of
Khrushchev's domestic programs and the ongoing Kremlin
power struggle. Transferring emphasis from a manpower-
intensive ground strategy to a technology-intensive
nuclear deterrent strategy would save rubles that could
be channeled into long-overlooked modes of domestic

1960), Section II, p. USSR/3; also Moncrieff, p. 23.

[93]"Khrushchev often boasts about the Soviet
missiles or spreads all kinds of propaganda about them.
Often a new-model missile is still only in the testing
stage--in fact, the tests may have proved unsuccessful--
but there he is, already screaming to the entire world
about his 'achievements' in new types of Soviet weapons.
The idea of Khrushchev and the Presidium . . . is to
demonstrate somehow Soviet supremacy in the nuclear field
by any possible means. . . . In short, Khrushchev often
brags about things we do not yet have. Varentsov . . .
often says: 'we are only thinking about those things,
we are only planning. Even if we actually achieved some
successes here and there, we still have a long way to go
before we actually achieve the things about which
Khrushchev keeps talking and boasting.'" See Penkovskiy,
pp. 336-37.

investment. The effect of such investment would bolster Khrushchev's claims of socialist superiority.[94] Khrushchev's designs for deemphasis of ground forces and concurrent buildup of strategic nuclear forces met great resistance from the Soviet military establishment. Soviet military doctrine had never accepted the concept of strategic airpower acting independently from Soviet ground forces, in contrast to the strong American tradition of strategic airpower that was so strongly reinforced by Curtis LeMay's successful B-29 campaign against Japan.

Time and events were on Khrushchev's side. His Suez gamble was dramatically successful in demonstrating the value of intercontinental rockets for enforcing Soviet foreign policy objectives in areas where direct intervention might be difficult or even impossible. Every Soviet rocket success, of which the October 1957 launching of Sputnik I was the most dramatic, tended to strengthen Khrushchev's hand against the recalcitrant generals. Marshal Zhukov was stripped of power in October 1957, and two and a half years later, Marshals V. D. Sokolovsky and Ivan S. Konev, the last two holdouts from the old Zhukov administration, were

---

[94]Garthoff, pp. 255-56.

retired.[95] Khrushchev had won a dual victory: not
only had he removed the last remnants of resistance to
his policy of strategic nuclear deterrence, but in the
process he was able to consolidate personal control of
the military establishment. Contrary to the American
experience, when Soviet strategic missiles became
operational, they were not integrated into the existing
structure of the armed forces. A separate branch, the
Strategic Rocket Forces, was created in December 1959.
Since then it has been considered the primary service.[96]

When the Suez Crisis broke out, Khrushchev's
campaign to shift emphasis to nuclear missiles was in a
critical transition phase. The Soviet Union, operating
with a severely limited economic base relative to the
United States, could not afford to produce long-range
strategic bombers and develop new ICBMs simultaneously.
One or the other had to be compromised. An overview of
the bomber and missile gaps provides an effective vehicle
for understanding both how the compromise was established

---

[95]Ibid., p. 258.

[96]William F. Scott, "Soviet Aerospace Forces:
Continuity and Contrast," Air Force Magazine 59 (March
1976): 45. One might speculate that the newly created
command might have had special loyalty to Khrushchev,
much as the American Green Berets developed a personal
loyalty to Kennedy in the early 1960s. See also Raymond
L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New
York: Praeger, 1958), pp. 222-35.

and how Khrushchev was able to cover himself militarily
during a period of strategic weakness. The Suez Crisis
chronologically fell between the two gaps.

The bomber gap began in May 1955 with the
deceptive fly-by of long-range Bison bombers, presumably
in squadron strength. The West then became alarmed
that the Soviets had surpassed the US in heavy bomber
production. In actuality, neither US qualitative nor
quantitative superiority in long-range manned aircraft
was ever seriously challenged, but this fact was not
established until direct reconnaissance of the Soviet
Union by U-2s began in the Summer of 1956.[97] National
Intelligence Estimates of Soviet bomber production were
revised downward, and the monthly production rate of
B-52s was reduced in April 1957.[98]

The missile gap followed closely on the heels of
the bomber gap, since the inference was drawn that if
the Soviets were not producing bombers, then they were
undoubtedly channeling the money into missile develop-
ment. The first Soviet ICBM firing in August 1957

[97]Horelick and Rush, pp. 17-18; also Edgar M.
Bottome, The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of
Military and Political Policy (Cranbury, N.J.: Associ-
ated University Presses, 1971), p. 173.

[98]Colin S. Gray, "'Gap' Prediction and America's
Defense: Arms Race Behavior in the Eisenhower Years,"
Orbis 16 (Spring 1972): 262.

followed by the launching of Sputnik I in October

spurred the perception that another gap had formed.[99]

Necessary reliance on worst-case planning in the absence

of hard intelligence as to Soviet intent resulted in

Soviet missile strength estimates that were predicated

on potential maximum production capability. When the

figures thus generated were placed alongside actual

American production figures, a missile gap resulted.

When it became clear in 1961 that actual Soviet missile

production was falling well short of the prognosticated

theoretical capability, the gap dissolved.[100]

The Soviet threat system, falling as it did

neatly between the two gaps, was related to both.

Khrushchev was still able to take advantage of the

bomber gap predisposition to exaggerate Soviet strategic

---

[99]Ibid., p. 268. Roy Licklider presents a conflicting interpretation: the missile gap was the result of a deliberate decision of the Eisenhower administration to allow the Soviets to develop a lead (potentially) in liquid-fueled ICBMs, while the US accepted the longer lead time necessary to develop more efficient and unquestionably superior solid-fueled missiles. The administration "decided that the risk was worth taking, took it, and in the end never had to face its ultimate test." See Roy E. Licklider, "The Missile Gap Controversy," Political Science Quarterly 85 (December 1970): 614.

[100]Bottome, p. 176; Licklider, p. 611; also Gray, "'Gap' Prediction," p. 272. Kennedy was able to act decisively in October 1962, not only because the US had superiority in both manned bombers and ICBMs, but also because for maybe the first time since 1955, an American administration knew it!

power. More important, his rocket threats against
Britain and France, if not wholeheartedly believed,
nonetheless were allowed to pass without substantive
challenge. Khrushchev's strategy of mutual and shared
risk was vindicated; prima facie evidence of Soviet
missile power had gone unchallenged by the Western
world, thereby laying the groundwork for the upcoming
missile gap.

The undeniably successful "adventurist" tactic
of rocket-rattling reinforced Khrushchev's personal
style of brinkmanship that would manifest itself in
Quemoy, West Berlin, and Cuba over the next six years.
By 1962 even the Soviet Union's closed society could
no longer serve as a shield to Western knowledge of the
true capability of Soviet strategic forces.

A final passage from Khrushchev's memoirs is
most revealing:

> This statement by the Soviet Government [prospect
> of Britain's being attacked by rockets] evidently
> influenced them. Previously they had apparently
> thought that we were simply bluffing when we
> openly said that the Soviet Union possessed
> powerful rockets. But then they saw that we
> really had rockets. And this had its effect.[101]
> (Italics mine.)

Nobody had seen any rockets--they only thought
they had.

---

[101]Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 435.

Subsidiary Motives of the Threat System

The Soviet threat system is theoretically important because of the saliency of subsidiary motives, i.e., motives quite separate from the ostensive one of actually effecting a cease-fire in Egypt. Each of the identifiable subsidiary motives is discussed below.

Gain Nasser's Appreciation and Trust

The path to hegemony or at least influence in Egypt lay through Gamal Abdel Nasser. If the outcome of the Suez Crisis could be manipulated so as to place Nasser in Khrushchev's debt, the Soviet Union would then have a stronger basis for maintaining its influence.

This policy goal ended in failure because Khrushchev was unwilling to take the necessary risks that would have been entailed in eliminating the crucial delay in the delivery of the threats. To gain Nasser's full appreciation, the threats should have been made while the outcome in Hungary and the American diplomatic position were still in question. Because an untoward turn of events in Hungary or a change in the American position could have affected far more important interests than the peripheral one of Egypt, these issues

had to be resolved before Khrushchev could commit him-
self in the Middle East. The necessity to establish
priorities among conflicting interests contributes to
the understanding of the crucial role of ambiguity.

Penkovskiy later noted that after post-Suez
attempts to exploit Nasser's nationalism had failed,
Khrushchev "prefers to have Nasser's position grow
weaker and weaker, and he is even disposed to having
Nasser removed and replaced by someone else."[102]

Gain Physical Presence in the Middle East

One can discern three separate bids to introduce
Soviet troops to Egypt, i.e., within the framework of
the UN, in cooperation with the US, and unilaterally.
All three bids failed, due in large part to Eisenhower's
strong stand against any direct superpower intervention,
either within or without the UNEF. The prospect of
physical intervention was "certainly glittering,"[103] as
it would have provided the USSR with an entré to
increased influence in Egyptian affairs and physical
access to the Mediterranean and all of Arab Africa. More

---

[102]Penkovskiy, pp. 368-69.

[103]J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of
Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1963), p. 190.

importantly, it would have bypassed Dulles' "northern tier" that was specifically designed to block Soviet access to Northern Africa and the Middle East.

Gain Prestige from Favorable World Opinion

Ensuring that the Soviet Union garnered the credit for stopping the aggression was as important a policy goal as actually bringing about a cease-fire. The two goals were approached differently. The decisive factor in bringing about the cease-fire was American economic pressure on Britain. This was brought about by raising the spectre of direct Soviet intervention in Egypt. The decisive factor in allowing the Soviet Union to take credit for the cease-fire was the broadcast and publication of the rocket-rattling threats against Britain and France.

Soviet interpretations of the Suez Crisis cite the Russian threats as the decisive factor, usually alluding to their direct effect on Britain and France, rather than their indirect effect on the United States. One account cites the "especially firm position of the Soviet Union."[104] Another typical accounts reads:

---

[104]General Major N. Ya. Sushko and Colonel S. A. Tyushkevich, eds., Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, cited by William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman,

The clear and firm position of the Soviet
Union in defense of Egypt, its determination
to take an active part in the restraining of
the aggressors, in the restoration of peace
in the Near East, in averting a new world war,
proved to have a sobering influence on the
ruling circles of England and France and to
have played a decisive role in the cessation
of hostilities.[105]

Khrushchev himself noted that Soviet prestige

was enhanced "not only among the Egyptian people, but

among all peoples who had recently freed themselves

from colonial slavery or who were still waging their

struggles for independence."[106]

Expose the US as a Hypo-
critical Actor

A subsidiary motive of the threat system was to

convince the world that the US had not only failed to

halt the aggression, but had actually played an active

role in aiding and abetting the colluders. Walter

Laqueur notes that in the diplomatic and propaganda

battle between the two superpowers, Britain, France,

and Israel were only secondary factors. "The main task

was to prove to the Arabs that Dulles and American

Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), p. 98.

[105]The Suez Issue and the Imperialistic Aggres-
sion Against Egypt, pp. 101-2, cited by Dallin, p. 418.

[106]Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 436-
37.

foreign policy had been the real culprits."[107]

Expulsion of the last remnants of British and French colonial influence in Egypt would leave a power vacuum that would most certainly be filled by one of the superpowers. Since both the US and USSR had supported Nasser diplomatically between nationalization and the beginning of hostilities (much the more painful course for the US than for the Soviets), Khrushchev had to find some means of demonstrating Soviet willingness to take military risks on Nasser's behalf, knowing full well that the US could never threaten military opposition to its NATO allies.

Bulganin's joint force proposal to Eisenhower was the means by which the true American position would be exposed. Before the note was sent, Khrushchev replied to a skeptical Molotov as follows:

> Of course he won't [accept the proposal], but by putting him in the position of having to refuse, we'll expose the hypocrisy of his public statement, condemning the attack against Egypt. We'll make him put his money where his mouth is. If he were really against the aggression, then he'd accept the Soviet Union's proposal for us jointly to safeguard Egypt's independence.[108]

After the note was sent and rejected, Khrushchev

---

[107]Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 241.

[108]Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 434.

was exuberant that his purpose had been achieved:

> So our note had done exactly what it was supposed
> to do; it had put the lie to the American claim
> of being fighters for peace and justice and non-
> aggression. They may have been fighters in
> words, but not in deeds, and we had unmasked
> them.[109]

The contradictory sanctions enumerated in the
threat messages can now be seen as the direct result of
the existence of various subsidiary motives, all of
which could not be furthered by identical statements.
The US was certainly a target of the threat system, but
it would have been incongruous for Khrushchev to have
threatened Eisenhower with direct military force. For
one thing, the US and USSR had consistently been on the
same side of the Suez issue diplomatically; for another,
Soviet strategic power was so grossly inferior to that
of the US as to preclude that course of action.
Khrushchev hit upon the proposal for joint and direct
intervention as the perfect vehicle by which to convince
all the Arabs that the US had only been providing a
diplomatic front for her allies and that the US was
unwilling to take risks in the defense of Egypt. The
truth of the matter was that American pressure, though
very real, had to be applied on her allies out of the
public eye. Soviet pressure for a cease-fire had the

---

[109]Ibid., p. 435.

advantage of being under the bright lights. This one facet of the threat system was a diplomatic coup for Khrushchev.

Widen the Existing NATO Rift

A serious rift between Britain and France on the one hand and the US on the other would have been created in the absence of any Soviet diplomatic or military initiatives whatsoever. Given the existence of the rift, it was a subsidiary motive of the threat system to exacerbate it. Shepilov's cable to the President of the Security Council and Bulganin's note to Eisenhower were both manifestations of this policy goal.

The US was placed in a no-win situation. Any level of Soviet-American military cooperation in the Middle East would have dealt NATO a crippling blow. Therefore, the American refusal to participate in a joint force was a foregone conclusion; yet the refusal, as understandable as it was in terms of Western political realities, provided a ready source of ammunition to Soviet propagandists intent on demonstrating American hypocrisy to Egypt and the Arab world.[110]

---

[110]A typical Soviet interpretation: "The U.S.A. did not accept the Soviet offer and in so doing confirmed their participation in the military adventure

239

In any event, the American refusal to join the
Soviets in a joint military operation did not affect
continuing efforts by the Eisenhower administration to
force a cease-fire through quieter means. These efforts
could not help but create an atmosphere of bitter
resentment within the NATO alliance.

Further Khrushchev's Personal
Motives

1. The threat system probably succeeded beyond
Khrushchev's wildest expectations in demonstrating the
potential coercive power of Soviet strategic missile
might. One can easily imagine Khrushchev disarming his
more recalcitrant generals with the following immutable
logic: "If we can scare the West so effectively
without really having missiles, think what we can do
after we actually have them!" After Suez, it would be
politically impossible to oppose Khrushchev's efforts
to develop an ICBM capability rapidly.

2. The tactical success of the threats did much

against Egypt. During the entire period of the Suez
crisis the U.S.A. did its best to conceal its true role
of a participant and even organizer of the campaign
against Egypt, hiding behind declarations of anti-
colonialism and hypocritical criticism of the British
and French colonialist policy in the Near and Middle
East." See Akademiia Nauk SSSR vostokovedeniia, Araby
v bor'be za nezavisimost', p. 194, cited by Smolansky,
"Moscow and the Suez Crisis," p. 594.

to undermine the position of those military chiefs who still clung to the traditional Soviet doctrine that airpower (and by association, missile power) was only useful when tied to the support of ground forces. The success of Khrushchev's threats would tend to silence those in the military who were critical of his "adventurism," and to make it easier for Khrushchev to remove them eventually. This process was in fact begun with the removal of Marshal Zhukov in October 1957. Suez therefore had the same reinforcing effect on Khrushchev's policies as did the successful launch of Sputnik I. Khrushchev's position as the leading advocate of a strong and doctrinally independent strategic missile force was vindicated. His strengthened position then facilitated his later moves to bring the Soviet military establishment under closer personal control.

3. Khrushchev was successful in both taking advantage of and reinforcing the Western predisposition to exaggerate Soviet military strength. The success of the Suez threats lay the groundwork for the forthcoming Western perception of a missile gap. This was important because Western fears of a missile gap would keep the West on the strategic defensive while the Soviet Union

was in the vulnerable transition phase from manned
bombers to ballistic missiles.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This chapter is divided into three sections,
with each building upon the previous one. First,
substantive conclusions concerning the Suez Crisis are
discussed. Next, hypotheses concerning the role of
ambiguity in strategic deterrence are presented. The
hypotheses are expressed in general terms, as they are
intended to apply to a wide range of cases. The final
section presents some methodological innovations that
may prove useful in future research on deterrence
ambiguity. Based on the findings of the thesis, an
alternative to the two-party/one-issue model of
deterrence is presented.

Substantive Conclusions from
the Suez Case Study

Conclusions in this section are historically
verifiable and substantive rather than theoretical in
nature. They lay the groundwork for the theoretical
hypotheses that are posited in the next section.

1. The Soviet threat system is representative
of the class of threats in which the demand is explicit,

but the sanction is ambiguous. The Soviet demand was
that the forces of Britain, France, and Israel terminate
all hostilities in Egypt. The threatened sanction could
be interpreted variously as Soviet participation in the
UN Emergency Force, introduction of Soviet forces into
Egypt as part of a multilateral effort outside the UN,
unilateral introduction of Soviet forces, sending of
Soviet volunteers to Egypt, nuclear missile attack on
Britain and France, and employment of sufficient mili-
tary force to jeopardize Israel's existence as a state.

2. Subsidiary motives, i.e., motives other
than the ostensive one of effecting a cease-fire, were
salient in the Soviet threat system. As evidence of
this, the Soviets delayed their threats until the
imminent amphibious invasion could no longer be
prevented. The threats were delayed until (a) the
Soviets could be assured of their eventual victory in
Hungary; (b) the Soviets could be sure that the United
States was irrevocably opposed to the actions of her
NATO allies; and (c) the autonomous probability that a
cease-fire would occur shortly in Egypt was so high that
there would be little actual risk in making the threats.

Creating the impression that the Soviets had
effected the cease-fire was every bit as important as
bringing it about. One can present a strong argument

that Soviet goals would have been enhanced more by
continued Anglo-French aggression in Egypt than by a
quick cease-fire.[1] Therefore, one must turn to the set
of subsidiary motives in order to explain how, why,
and when the Soviet threat system was mobilized.

3. The missile threats against London and Paris
were bluffs in terms of Soviet capability in 1956. The
Soviets had no operational missiles that could reach
London and only a few tactical missiles that could reach
Paris. The Soviets were grossly inferior to the United
States in terms of strategic capability. If London and
Paris had been attacked with Soviet missiles, the Suez
invasion would have paled in significance, and American
retaliation would have been decisive.

In light of the strategic imbalance between the
two superpowers, Dulles' failure to expose the weak
military basis of the threats must be recorded as a
major American policy failure. The perception that the
Soviet threats had deterred further Anglo-French
aggression was allowed to go unchallenged. Khrushchev

---

[1]The US would have been forced to use more overt
forms of pressure against its allies, thereby widening
the NATO split. If the newly constituted UNEF actually
had to separate the combatants, Britain and France would
have been even more humiliated by the Suez Crisis than
they were. See Smolansky, "Moscow and the Suez Crisis,"
p. 599.

was reinforced in his gambling style of diplomacy that would lead the world down a path of crisis and confrontation in the six years between Suez and the Cuban missile crisis.

4. The Soviet level of resolve to employ military force in defense of Egypt was low. Three factors support this conclusion. First, any degree of resolve represented by the threat system was contradicted by concomitant Soviet actions, which demonstrated only caution and reserve. Second, by employing ambiguity, the threat system did not engage values such as national prestige or bargaining reputation; references to volunteers were ploys to avoid engaging these values. Third, the low level of resolve can be attributed primarily to Soviet preoccupation with Hungary. The Soviet leaders were not about to embark on a military adventure in Egypt while their position remained insecure in Eastern Europe, an area of far more importance to them.

5. Generally speaking, the Soviet threat system was much more successful in furthering Khrushchev's personal goals than the goals of Soviet state foreign policy.

      a. To gain Nasser's appreciation and trust (state goal): frustrated because of Nasser's

fierce neutralism and distrust of international
Communism.

b.   To gain physical presence in the Middle
East (state goal): unsuccessful because it was
forcefully countered by American response to
Soviet initiatives.

c.   To gain prestige from favorable world
opinion (state goal): frustrated largely
because of counterbalancing effect of the
Hungarian repression.

d.   To expose the US as a hypocritical
actor (state goal): basically successful, but
the advantage gained was ephemeral. Exposure
of Soviet tactics in dealing with the Hungarian
Revolution neutralized many of the "moral force"
gains that otherwise would have accrued to the
Soviet Union.

e.   To widen the existing NATO rift (state
goal): mixed success. One could argue that the
quick cease-fire actually saved NATO rather than
hurt it. Britain and France both recognized
that their lack of strategic weaponry limited
their ability to act in opposition to American
foreign policy. Britain reacted by drawing
closer to the American deterrent, while France

drew away from it and constructed her own independent strategic nuclear force. Drawing France away from NATO can be considered a victory for the Soviet Union, but Suez was only one factor of many influencing the French decision.

f. To demonstrate the potential coercive power of Soviet strategic missiles (personal goal): successful because the implicit claim of Soviet missile power went unchallenged by the US. Khrushchev's personal goal of creating a doctrinally independent strategic missile force was furthered.

g. To undermine the position of the doctrinally conservative military chiefs (personal goal): successful because Khrushchev's apparently successful employment of missile threats silenced his military critics, paving the way for their replacement by generals who would owe their positions to Khrushchev and would be more receptive to his doctrinal reforms.

h. To reinforce Western proclivity to exaggerate Soviet military strength (personal goal): successful as evidenced by the

subsequent missile gap. Khrushchev's personal gambling style of diplomacy, as long as he was dealing from weakness, depended on Western misjudgment of the strength of Soviet nuclear arms.

6. To the extent that the Soviet threat system was instrumental in effecting the cease-fire, the mechanism of its success was not direct nuclear threat, which was discounted at the time, but the raising of American anxieties about possible Soviet military intervention in Egypt. The US, by bringing about the cease-fire through economic pressure, was cutting Western diplomatic losses in an operation that from the very beginning had contained the seeds of its own failure.

    a. Reduced British and French military strength forced a delay in the invasion until a rapid _fait accompli_ was no longer possible.

    b. The anachronistic colonialist operation went against the grain of postwar emerging nationalism and was sure to bring the wrath of the UN down on the colluders.

    c. The nationalization as it was carried out by Nasser was quite defensible under international law since traffic was not to be

restricted, shareholders were to be compensated, and ownership of the canal was to revert to Egypt in 1968 in any event.

Theoretical Hypotheses Supported by the Suez Case Study

Items in this section can be considered conclusions as they relate to the Suez Crisis, but to the extent that they have theoretical implications beyond this one instance of deterrence, they are hypotheses. As such, they require additional empirical support from quantitative designs or qualitative designs employing an expanded data base.

To preserve continuity, section headings are consistent with those used in Chapter III. Though some of the hypotheses are similar to findings from the survey of literature, they are listed here separately to emphasize the value of the historical-analytic method for isolating variables and generating hypotheses.

Functions of Ambiguity

1. Ambiguity enables a threat to perform a communications function. The Soviet threat system marked the transition from a diplomatic to a military context, and in so doing communicated to the targets

that higher level interests had been engaged.[2]
Ambiguity allowed the Soviet Union to employ its
nuclear power as a diplomatic means of influence
without arousing a dysfunctionally high level of fear.
Thus the use of ambiguity shaded the meaning of the
threat system to the following: "I am prepared to use
conventional military force directly and nuclear force
<u>diplomatically</u> as a means of influence." It is one of
the paradoxes of the nuclear age that the superpowers,
though overwhelmingly superior to the rest of the world
in nuclear arms, have great difficulty in bringing the
weight of this nuclear superiority to bear in specific
cases. Ambiguity functions so as to allow a superpower
to bring its nuclear forces to bear on these specific

---

[2]Of interest here is Edward Azar's theory that
over a period of time nations establish between them an
interaction range known as the "normal relations range"
(NRR). The upper threshold of the NRR marks that level
of hostility above which signals are regarded as unac-
ceptable. Interaction above the upper threshold of the
NRR implies that a crisis situation has set in. Within
the framework of Azar's theory, one could argue that
ambiguity serves an important function of reducing fear
arousal and enhancing communications when interaction
between two states escalates to the point where they are
in the transition phase from the NRR to crisis condi-
tions. This hypothesis is contradicted (this author
feels incorrectly) by Azar, who holds that ambiguity
tends to disappear when two nations begin to interact
outside the thresholds of their NRR. See Edward A. Azar,
"Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an
International Crisis: Suez 1956," <u>Journal of Conflict
Resolution</u> 16 (June 1972): 184-86.

issues.[3]

    2.   Ambiguity provides the mechanism by which a third party may be established as a target, even though it is not directly threatened. Soviet military threats were directed only towards Britain, France, and Israel, but the mechanism by which the cease-fire was brought about was American economic pressure on Britain. The American pressure was spurred by anxieties raised through the spectre of Soviet intervention in Egypt. Of theoretical importance is the fact that a state need only perceive its interests to be threatened for it to be the target of a threat. The Soviets were unable to threaten the US directly due to the disparity in strategic arms.

    3.   Ambiguity protects a state's long-term goals which may be jeopardized by the use of a deterrence strategy to further short-term goals. During the Suez Crisis, traditionally expansionist Soviet foreign policy came in conflict with the supreme long-term goal of preserving the Soviet state. An explicit threat on Egypt's behalf would have increased the possibility of war, thus endangering the long-term goal of national

---

[3]This function may be particularly applicable to those cases such as Suez in which there is pronounced asymmetry between source and target military capabilities.

survival. Ambiguity ensured that commitment to military force was not created through the engagement of values such as national prestige and bargaining reputation. Ambiguity allowed the Soviet Union to minimize risk to national survival while aggressively pursuing short-term foreign policy goals.

4. Ambiguity is useful for taking advantage of the target's predisposition to exaggerate the source's capabilities. It is evident that the Soviet threat system relied upon the same sort of Western perceptions that spawned the bomber gap in 1955. Throughout the Cold War the West consistently overestimated Soviet capabilities in the absence of hard intelligence. One would expect that this function of ambiguity has gone into decline since the advent of sophisticated satellite reconnaissance systems. However, one must remember that these systems are only available to the superpowers. In deterrence relationships between states not privy to the intelligence gained from satellite sensors, this function of ambiguity will continue to be important.

5. A function of ambiguity is to reinforce the target's predisposition to exaggerate source capability. The Suez Crisis was followed closely by the perception of a missile gap and by decisive British and French moves to enhance their capability to counter Soviet

nuclear power.   The fact that the means chosen by the
British and French totally diverged does not detract
from the fact that these post-Suez moves were motivated
by feelings of helplessness when confronted by (evident)
Soviet strategic missile power.

Creating Ambiguity

1. The decision makers of a closed society are
able to employ ambiguity as a manipulable policy tool
more easily than decision makers of a democratic society.
The Suez case study of course provides no comparative
data on the facility with which democratic states can
employ ambiguity in their threats. However, one cannot
fail to be impressed by the facility with which
Khrushchev was able to deliver mutually conflicting and
internally ambiguous messages to five addressees in a
short period of time. A closed society affords its
decision makers the following advantages:

a. No adversary reporting by an independent
free press.

b. Noise is restricted, if not eliminated.

c. Dissent among decision makers is not
publicized. In contrast, Anthony Eden was
severely weakened by Hugh Gaitskell's avowed
intention "through the influence of public

opinion, to bring every pressure to bear upon the Government to withdraw from the impossible situation into which they have put us."[4] Undoubtedly there was dissent among Soviet decision makers, but it was effectively hidden from view.

d. It is much easier for a closed society to hide its true level of resolve from the target. Misleading intelligence reports reaching Washington on the morning of 6 November played into Khrushchev's hand because there were few other indications of resolve which might have provided a more realistic backdrop.

e. It is more difficult to discern the true level of military capability of a closed society. Ambiguity builds upon uncertainty, and the bomber and missile gaps that flanked the Suez Crisis attest to the level of uncertainty and deception that eixsted at the time.

---

[4] Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 558 (1956): 1462, cited by Leon D. Epstein, "Partisan Foreign Policy; Britain in the Suez Crisis," World Politics 12 (January 1960): 208.

2. The simultaneous issuing of contradictory
messages is a means of creating ambiguity. Each
message had internal ambiguities, but the threat system
as a whole was ambiguous due to the vast contradictions
between messages, especially in terms of the sanction
that would be imposed if a cease-fire were not forth-
coming.

Determinants of Ambiguity

1. Ambiguity is correlated with the salience
of subsidiary motives. While ambiguity may detract
from the strictly military deterrence value of a threat,
it may enhance subsidiary goals. In the Type I
Deterrence relationship between the superpowers,
ambiguity is low because the primary goal of national
survival is much more salient than any subsidiary
motivations. However, in situations such as Suez,
detterent threats do much more than just threaten.
Subsidiary motives are extremely important, and the
result is a high degree of ambiguity.

If there are a number of subsidiary motives
behind a threat, any given statement will affect each
motive differently. In the extreme case, a given
statement might support one motive and detract from
another. Therefore when conflicting interests are

END
DATE
FILMED

11 -77

DDC

affected by the communication of a deterrent threat,

the nature of that threat will be dictated by compro-

mises. The character of the compromises will be

determined by the relative priority of all affected

goals. The resultant tradeoffs surface as ambiguity.

The targets of the Suez threat system saw only

the tip of the iceberg when they tried to make sense

out of the contradictory and ambiguous messages. The

hidden part of the iceberg was the set of subsidiary

motives, known only to the source. Only by looking

behind the ostensive goal of deterrence can the target

of an ambiguous threat perceive ambiguity as a rational

strategy. In terms of policy relevance, the target of

a threat may not always know what constitutes the

complete set of subsidiary motivations, but if his

conceptual frame includes provision for these motives,

then the existence of ambiguity at least shows him where

to look. Ambiguity then becomes an explainable

phenomenon and not the enigma it is under the two-party/

one-issue model of deterrence behavior.

2. Ambiguity in threats emanating from a

closed society is indicative of dissension among foreign

policy elites.

S. I. Ploss, after noting the discordant nature

of Soviet foreign policy pronouncements prior to the

emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba, noted that
various regime spokesmen came out with varying policies
and views, casting a shadow over the usually monolithic
Soviet foreign policy. Ploss posited the following
hypothesis:

> Political systems with a low tolerance for
> dissent are not free of the foreign policy
> uncertainties that characterize the political
> processes of more open societies.[5]

Common sense would dictate the truth of the
hypothesis. The image of a monolithic foreign policy
can be maintained only insofar as the decision makers
of a closed society are able to resolve policy differ-
ences behind closed doors. The resultant policy state-
ment may be monolithic, but it may also be ambiguous.
Thus the ambiguity of the Suez threat system may be a
reflection of dissension between the flamboyant
Khrushchev and his more conservative military chiefs.
The military was extremely uncomfortable with the
Soviet missile threats, first because the Red Army was
heavily committed in Eastern Europe at the time, and
second, the military would have had to pick up the
pieces if Khrushchev's diplomacy had backfired. That a
more explicit statement of the Soviet nuclear threat was

---

[5]S. I. Ploss, "The Uncertainty of Soviet Foreign
Policy," World Politics 15 (April 1963): 464.

not made may have been Khrushchev's sop to the military establishment, reflecting a lack of consensus at the highest levels.

3. The capriciousness and personal style of key decision makers must be considered as determinants of ambiguity. Personality variables have always been the bane of systematic and scientific study of foreign policy formulation. However, it is an inescapable fact that the ambiguous nature of the Soviet threat system employed in the Suez Crisis was consistent with Khrushchev's personal style of diplomacy.

4. The set of subsidiary motives of a deterrent threat must include the personal motives of key decision makers as well as state motives. The apparent success of the Soviet nuclear threats played into Khrushchev's personal hand to such an uncanny degree that it is reasonable to conclude that Khrushchev subverted Soviet foreign policy in the Suez Crisis to his own personal goals.

Effects of Ambiguity

1. Existence of an explicit demand inhibits dysfunctional coping behavior that otherwise might result from a highly ambiguous sanction. The graphic approach illustrated by Figure 4, page 138, is

supported by the Suez case study. Ambiguity of sanction was extremely high, so the threat was operating far to the right on Graph III, in the area in which one would expect the rate of target compliance to drop off rapidly were it not for the stabilizing influence of an explicitly understood demand.

Methodological Implications

1. Ambiguity of demand and sanction must be treated as separate variables in the scientific study of deterrence behavior. Their causes are differentiable, and in terms of fear arousal and target compliance, their effects may be radically different.

2. Ambiguity must be treated as both a dependent and independent variable in the empirically supported supposition that ambiguity has both causes and effects. The existing literature is heavily biased towards treatment of ambiguity as an independent variable. However, there are any number of reasons why uncertainty may manifest itself as ambiguity in the statement of a deterrence threat. One significant reason is that a nation may be forced to make a deterrence attempt at a given time because of existing alliance structure, commitments, or domestic pressures even though internal foreign policy uncertainties may

still exist. The nation in such a case hedges its bet through the use of ambiguity--as much to placate internal interests as to influence external ones.

3. The importance of personality variables in the Suez case dictates that qualitative research designs will continue to be important in deterrence research. The personality, diplomatic style, and personal motives of Khrushchev played key roles in the definition of an ambiguous Soviet threat system. Qualitative case study designs are better adapted to the study of these factors than quantitative designs.

4. The Soviet threat system does not conform to the two-party/one-issue model of classical deterrence theory. This is true for two reasons. First, deterring continued Anglo-French aggression in Egypt was at best only one of many motives, and at worst may have been one of the lesser of those motives. Second, the Soviet threat system was only one of many factors behind the ultimate cease-fire decision. It most certainly had no bearing on the Israeli cease-fire, which had been in effect for a half day prior to receipt of the Soviet threats.

Figure 9 illustrates an alternative model that more accurately depicts the relationship between the Soviet threat system and the actual decision to declare

Fig. 9. Model of the Soviet threat system.

a cease-fire. One would suspect that the model is
applicable to many instances of "pure" deterrence. The
model is more complex than the normal model of deterrence
interaction, but to the extent that it more accurately
represents the true situation, it should be an aid to
analysis. At the very least, the model demonstrates
that treating the Soviet threat system as an instance
of pure military deterrence is grossly simplistic and
misleading.

    5. The criteria by which deterrent threats are
judged need to be changed. The two traditional criteria
have been compliance with the source's demand and non-
recourse to military force. Analysts may continue to
judge a deterrence attempt by its degree of success,
but "success" must be broadened to include the degree
to which the deterrence attempt fulfills subsidiary
motives.

    The major disadvantage of including subsidiary
motives in the deterrence model is that the model no
longer depicts a tidy dyadic relationship amenable to
simple coding and analysis. However, any inconvenience
incurred by making the model more complex is outweighed
by the fact that the new model more closely reflects
reality. All models sacrifice some of their analogical
validity in order to facilitate analysis, but subsidiary

motives are too important a determinant of deterrence behavior to be ignored.

This thesis has examined the role of ambiguity in strategic deterrence from both a theoretical and historical standpoint. If the substance of the thesis has pointed towards any single overall conclusion, it is that deterrence theory has become separated from the mainstream of international relations. Deterrence theorists must now realize that their subject is as much concerned with competing objectives and pragmatic compromise strategies--with political considerations-- as any other subject of international relations. In a sentence, the role of ambiguity is to form a link between the highly specialized and purely military concept of deterrence and the more general context of international relations in which it is imbedded.

WORKS CITED

WORKS CITED

I. Theory and Methodology

A. Books

Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision; Explaining the
        Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown,
        1971.

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., and Leiss, Amelia C. Control-
        ling Small Wars. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
        1969.

Boulding, Kenneth E. Conflict and Defense; A General
        Theory. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Prince-
        ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Bunge, Mario. Causality; The Place of the Causal
        Principle in Modern Science. Cambridge:
        Harvard University Press, 1959.

deRivera, Joseph H. The Psychological Dimension of
        Foreign Policy. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill,
        1968.

de Sola Pool, Ithiel. "Deterrence as an Influence
        Process." In Theory and Research on the Causes
        of War, pp. 189-96. Edited by Dean G. Pruitt
        and Richard C. Snyder. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
        Prentice-Hall, 1969.

Deutsch, Karl W. The Nerves of Government. New York:
        The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

Deutsch, Morton. The Resolution of Conflict. New
        Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Dougherty, James E., and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr.
        Contending Theories of International Relations.
        Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971.

Druckman, Daniel. Human Factors in International Negotiations: Social-Psychological Aspects of International Conflict. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973.

Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

Ellsberg, Daniel. "The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choice." In Approaches to Measurement in International Relations, pp. 288-94. Edited by John E. Mueller. New York: Meredith, 1969.

Feigl, Herbert. "Operationism and Scientific Method." In Readings in Philosophical Analysis, pp. 498-509. Edited by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949.

Fesler, James W. "The Case Method in Political Science." In Essays on the Case Method in Public Administration, pp. 65-88. Edited by Edwin A. Bock. New York: Inter-University Case Program, 1962.

George, Alexander L.; Hall, David K.; and Simons, William E. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy; Laos, Cuba, Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.

George, Alexander L., and Smoke, Richard. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

Green, Philip. Deadly Logic; The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966.

Hermann, Charles F. Crises in Foreign Policy. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969.

Holsti, K. J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

Holsti, Ole R. Crisis Escalation War. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972.

_____; Brody, Richard A.; and North, Robert C. "The Management of International Crises: Affect and Action in American-Soviet Relations." In Theory and Research on the Causes of War, pp. 62-79. Edited by Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.

Horelick, Arnold L., and Rush, Myron. Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

Hovland, Carl I.; Janis, Irving L.; and Kelley, Harold H. Communication and Persuasion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.

Ikle, Fred C. How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968. S.v. "Deterrence," by Richard A. Brody.

Janis, Irving L., and Smith, M. Brewster. "Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images." In International Behavior; A Social-Psychological Analysis, pp. 190-235. Edited by Herbert C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

Jervis, Robert. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Kahn, Herman. On Escalation; Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Praeger, 1965.

_____. On Thermonuclear War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Kelman, Herbert C. "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations." In International Behavior; A Social-Psychological Analysis, pp. 565-607. Edited by Herbert C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

Kennan, George F. Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920. Vol. 2: The Decision to Intervene. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.

Kissinger, Henry A. The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 1961.

Knorr, Klaus, and Morgenstern, Oskar. Political Conjecture in Military Planning. Princeton: Princeton University Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Policy Memorandum No. 35, November 1968.

Lafore, Laurence. The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971.

Lieberman, E. James. "Threat and Assurance in the Conduct of Conflict." In International Conflict and Behavioral Science, pp. 110-22. Edited by Roger Fisher. New York: Basic Books, 1964.

Naroll, Raoul. "Deterrence in History." In Theory and Research on the Causes of War, pp. 150-64. Edited by Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.

_____; Bullough, Vern L.; and Naroll, Frada. Military Deterrence in History; A Pilot Cross-Historical Survey. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974.

Paige, Glenn D. The Korean Decision. New York: Free Press, 1968.

Pruitt, Dean G. "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action." In International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, pp. 393-432. Edited by Herbert C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

_____, and Snyder, Richard C. Theory and Research on the Causes of Wars. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.

Quester, George H. Deterrence Before Hiroshima; The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966.

Rapaport, Anatol. Fights, Games, and Debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960.

Raser, John R., and Crow, Wayman J. "A Simulation Study of Deterrence Theories." In Social Processes in International Relations, pp. 372-89. Edited by Louis Kriesberg. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968.

Rosenau, James N. The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press, 1971.

Russett, Bruce M. "International Behavior Research: Case Studies and Cumulation." In Approaches to the Study of Political Science, pp. 425-43. Edited by Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel. Scranton, Ohio: Chandler, 1970.

Sawyer, Jack, and Guetzkow, Harold. "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations." In International Behavior; A Social-Psychological Analysis, pp. 466-520. Edited by Herbert C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

_____. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Schwartz, David C. "Decision Making in Historical and Simulated Crises." In International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, pp. 167-84. Edited by Charles F. Hermann. New York: Free Press, 1972.

Singer, J. David. "The Incompleat Theorist: Insight Without Evidence." In Contending Approaches to International Politics, pp. 62-86. Edited by Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.

_____. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." In The International System: Theoretical Essays, pp. 77-92. Edited by Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.

_____. "Theorists and Empiricists: The Two-Culture
Problem in International Politics." In The
Analysis of International Politics, pp. 80-95.
Edited by James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and
Maurice A. East. New York: Free Press, 1972.

Snyder, Glenn H. "Crisis Bargaining." In International
Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research,
pp. 217-56. Edited by Charles F. Hermann. New
York: Free Press, 1972.

Sorensen, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York: Harper &
Row, 1965.

Tedeschi, James T. "Threats and Promises." In The
Structure of Conflict, pp. 155-91. Edited by
Paul Swingle. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Vagts, Alfred. Defense and Diplomacy. New York: King's
Crown Press, 1956.

Young, Oran F. The Politics of Force; Bargaining
During International Crises. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1968.

Zinnes, Dina A.; North, Robert C.; and Koch, Howard E.,
Jr. "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of
War." In International Politics and Foreign
Policy, pp. 469-77. Edited by James N.
Rosenau. New York: Free Press, 1961.

B. Periodicals

Abel, Theodore. "The Element of Decision in the Pattern
of War." American Sociological Review 6
(December 1941): 853-59.

Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton S. "Decisions and
Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework."
American Political Science Review 57 (September
1963): 632-42.

Baldwin, David A. "Thinking About Threats." Journal of
Conflict Resolution 15 (March 1971): 71-78.

Berriman, Gerald D. "Fear Itself: An Anthropologist's
View." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

(November 1964): 8-11.

Blalock, H. M., Jr. "Correlational Analysis and Causal
        Inferences." American Anthropologist 62
        (August 1960): 624-31.

Bleicher, Samuel A. "Intergovernmental Organization
        and the Preservation of Peace: A Comment on the
        Abuse of Methodology." International Organiza-
        tion 25 (Spring 1971): 298-305.

Boulding, Kenneth E. "National Images and International
        Systems." Journal of Conflict Resolution 3
        (June 1959): 120-31.

Bull, Hedley. "International Theory: The Case for a
        Classical Approach." World Politics 18 (April
        1966): 361-77.

deLeon, Peter; MacQueen, James; and Rosecrance, Richard.
        "Situational Analysis in International
        Politics." Behavioral Science 14 (January
        1969): 51-58.

Deutsch, Morton, and Krauss, Robert M. "The Effect of
        Threat Upon Interpersonal Bargaining." Journal
        of Abnormal and Social Psychology 61 (September
        1960): 181-89.

Fedder, Edwin H. "Communication and American-Soviet
        Negotiating Behavior." Background 8 (August
        1964): 105-20.

Fink, Clinton F. "More Calculations About Deterrence."
        Journal of Conflict Resolution 9 (March 1965):
        54-65.

Geiwitz, P. James. "The Effects of Threats on
        Prisoner's Dilemma." Behavioral Science 12 (May
        1967): 232-33.

Gray, Colin S. "SALT I Aftermath: Have the Soviets
        Been Cheating?" Air Force Magazine 58 (November
        1975): 28-33.

Guetzkow, Harold. "The Potential of Case Study in
        Analyzing International Conflict." World
        Politics 14 (April 1962): 548-52.

Hermann, Margaret G. "Testing a Model of Psychological Stress." Journal of Personality 34 (September 1966): 381-96.

Higbee, Kenneth L. "Fifteen Years of Fear Arousal: Research on Threat Appeals: 1953-1968." Psychological Bulletin 72 (December 1969): 426-44.

Holsti, K. J. "Resolving International Conflict: A Taxonomy of Behavior and Some Figures on Procedures." Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 (September 1966): 272-96.

Holsti, Ole R. "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study." Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 (September 1962): 244-52.

Isnard, Jacques. "Pluton's Ambiguous Virtues." Manchester Guardian 2 (August 1975): 11.

Janis, Irving L., and Feshbach, Seymour. "Personality Differences Associated with Responsiveness to Fear-Arousing Communications." Journal of Personality 23 (December 1954): 154-66.

Janis, Irving L., and Terwilliger, Robert E. "An Experimental Study of Psychological Resistances to Fear Arousing Communications." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 65 (December 1962): 403-10.

Jervis, Robert. "Hypotheses on Misperception." World Politics 20 (April 1968): 454-59.

Kaplan, Morton A. "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations." World Politics 19 (October 1966): 1-20.

Kaplowitz, Stan A. "An Experimental Test of a Rationalistic Theory of Deterrence." Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (September 1973): 535-72.

Kelley, Harold H. "Experimental Studies of Threats in Interpersonal Negotiations." Journal of Conflict Resolution 9 (March 1965): 79-105.

Leventhal, Howard; Singer, Robert; and Jones, Susan. "Effects of Fear and Specificity of Recommendation Upon Attitudes and Behavior." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2 (July 1965): 20-29.

Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." American Political Science Review 65 (September 1971): 682-93.

Livant, William P. "On Deterrence." Journal of Conflict Resolution 5 (September 1961): 340.

Milburn, Thomas W. "What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 (March 1959): 138-45.

Moffitt, J. Weldon, and Stagner, Ross. "Perceptual Rigidity and Closure as Functions of Anxiety." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 52 (May 1956): 354-57.

Monks, Alfred L., and Griffin, Kenyon N. "Soviet Strategic Claims, 1964-1970." Orbis 16 (Summer 1972): 520-44.

Nitze, Paul H. "Soviet's Negotiating Style Assayed." Aviation Week and Space Technology 102 (17 February 1975): 40-43, and (24 February 1975): 63-69.

Pally, Sidney. "Cognitive Rigidity as a Function of Threat." Journal of Personality 23 (December 1954): 346-55.

Russett, Bruce M. "The Calculus of Deterrence." Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (June 1963): 97-109.

_____. "Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory." Journal of Peace Research 2 (1967): 89-105.

Schlenker, Barry R.; Bonoma, Thomas; Tedeschi, James T.; and Pivnick, William P. "Compliance to Threats as a Function of the Wording of the Threat and the Exploitativeness of the Threatener." Sociometry 33 (1970): 394-408.

Shomer, Robert W.; Davis, Alice H.; and Kelley, Harold
H. "Threats and the Development of Coordination:
Further Studies of the Deutsch and Krauss
Trucking Game." Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 4 (August 1966): 119-26.

Singer, J. David. "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal
Model." American Political Science Review 57
(June 1963): 420-30.

Smock, Charles D. "The Influence of Psychological
Stress on the 'Intolerance of Ambiguity.'"
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 50
(March 1955): 177-82.

Snyder, Glenn H. "Deterrence and Power." Journal of
Conflict Resolution 4 (June 1960): 163-78.

Terhune, Kenneth W. "Motives, Situation, and Inter-
personal Conflict Within Prisoner's Dilemma."
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
(Monograph Supplement) 8 (March 1968): 1-24.

Thomas, John R. "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis
of 1958." Orbis 6 (Spring 1962): 38-64.

Time, 17 November 1975, p. 52.

Tucker, Robert W. "Israel and the United States: From
Dependence to Nuclear Weapons?" Commentary 60
(November 1975): 29-43.

Van Atta, Lester C. "Arms Control: Human Control."
American Psychologist 18 (January 1963): 37-46.

Verba, Sidney. "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-
Rationality in Models of the International
System." World Politics 14 (October 1961):
93-117.

_____. "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research."
World Politics 20 (October 1967): 111-27.

Vital, David. "On Approaches to the Study of Interna-
tional Relations; Or Back to Machiavelli."
World Politics 19 (July 1967): 551-62.

Weinstein, Franklin B.   "The Concept of a Commitment in
     International Relations."   Journal of Conflict
     Resolution 13 (March 1969):   39-56.

II. Suez Crisis

A. Books

Bar-Zohar, Michael. Ben-Gurion, the Armed Prophet.
      Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

Beaufre, André. The Suez Expedition 1956. New York:
      Praeger, 1969.

Bottome, Edgard M. The Missile Gap: A Study of the
      Formulation of Military and Political Policy.
      Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses,
      1971.

Bowie, Robert R. Suez 1956. New York: Oxford Uni-
      versity Press, 1974.

Bromberger, Merry, and Bromberger, Serge. Secrets of
      Suez. London: Pan Books, 1957.

Dallin, David J. Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin.
      Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1961.

Dayan, Moshe. Diary of the Sinai Campaign. New York:
      Harper & Row, 1965.

Dmytryshyn, Basil. USSR; A Concise History. 2nd ed.
      New York: Scribner's, 1971.

Eden, Anthony. The Suez Crisis of 1956. Boston:
      Beacon Press, 1960.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace 1956-1961. Garden
      City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.

Finer, Herman. Dulles Over Suez. Chicago: Quadrangle
      Books, 1964.

Garthoff, Raymond L. "Khrushchev and the Military." In
      Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases, pp. 243-
      74. Edited by Alexander Dallin and Alan F.
      Westin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
      1966.

_____. Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age. New York: Praeger, 1958.

Green, William, and Fricker, John. The Air Forces of the World. New York: Hanover House, 1958.

Hayter, Sir William. The Kremlin and the Embassy. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

Heikal, Mohamed Hassanein. The Cairo Documents. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973.

Kerr, Malcolm H. The Arab Cold War; Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970. 3rd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers. Translated by Strobe Talbott. Introduction by Edward Crankshaw. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970.

_____. Khrushchev Remembers; The Last Testament. Translated by Strobe Talbott. Foreword by Edward Crankshaw. Introduction by Jerrold L. Schecter. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974.

Kilmuir, David. Political Adventure: The Memoirs of the Earl of Kilmuir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.

Kintner, William R., and Scott, Harriet Fast. The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968.

Kohl, Wilfrid. French Nuclear Diplomacy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Laqueur, Walter Z. The Soviet Union and the Middle East. New York: Praeger, 1959.

Love, Kennett. Suez; The Twice-Fought War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969.

Mackintosh, J. M. Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

McLaurin, Ronald E. The Middle East in Soviet Policy. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975.

Mezerik, A. G., ed. The Suez Canal; 1956 Crisis-1967
        War. New York: International Review Service,
        1969.

Moncrieff, Anthony, ed. Suez: Ten Years After. New
        York: Pantheon Books, 1966.

Morse, Edward L. Foreign Policy and Interdependence in
        Gaullist France. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
        University Press, 1973.

Nutting, Anthony. No End of a Lesson. New York:
        Clarkson N. Potter, 1967.

Ordway, Frederick I., III, and Wakeford, Ronald E., eds.
        International Missile and Spacecraft Guide.
        New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.

Penkovskiy, Oleg. The Penkovskiy Papers. Translated
        by Peter Deriabin. Foreword by Edward Crankshaw.
        Introduction by Frank Gibney. Garden City, N.Y.:
        Doubleday, 1965.

Pierre, Andrew J. Nuclear Politics: The British
        Experience With an Independent Strategic Force
        1939-1970. London: Oxford University Press,
        1972.

Ra'anan, Uri. The USSR Arms the Third World: Case
        Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy. Cambridge,
        Mass.: MIT Press, 1969.

Ro'i, Yaacov. From Encroachment to Involvement: A
        Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the
        Middle East, 1945-1973. New York: John Wiley
        & Sons, 1974.

Schwarz, Morton. The Foreign Policy of the USSR:
        Domestic Factors. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson,
        1975.

Smolansky, Oles M. The Soviet Union and the Arab East
        Under Khrushchev. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell
        University Press, 1974.

Snyder, William P. The Politics of British Defense
        Policy 1945-1962. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State
        University Press, 1964.

Speier, Hans. Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North
        Atlantic Alliance. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand
        Corp. RM-1837, [1956].

Stanley, John, and Pearton, Maurice. The International
        Trade in Arms. New York: Praeger, 1972.

Thomas, Hugh. Suez. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

Tunkin, G. I. Theory of International Law. Translated
        by William E. Butler. Cambridge, Mass.:
        Harvard University Press, 1974.

Ulam, Adam B. The Rivals: America and Russia Since
        World War II. New York: Viking Press, 1971.

Vatikiotis, P. J. "The Soviet Union and Egypt: The
        Nasser Years." In The Soviet Union and the
        Middle East, pp. 121-33. Edited by Ivo J.
        Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich. Stanford, Calif.:
        Hoover Institution Press, 1974.

B. Periodicals

Azar, Edward E. "Conflict Escalation and Conflict
        Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez
        1956." Journal of Conflict Resolution 16 (June
        1972): 183-201.

Badeau, John S. "The Soviet Approach to the Arab World."
        Orbis 3 (Spring 1959): 75-84.

Current Digest of the Soviet Press 8, 21 November-26
        December 1956.

Epstein, Leon D. "Partisan Foreign Policy: Britain
        in the Suez Crisis." World Politics 12 (January
        1960): 201-24.

Facts on File 16, 7 November-25 December 1956.

Gray, Colin S. "'Gap' Prediction and America's Defense:
        Arms Race Behavior in the Eisenhower Years."
        Orbis 16 (Spring 1972): 257-74.

Licklider, Roy E. "The Missile Gap Controversy."
          Political Science Quarterly 85 (December 1970):
          600-14.

Murphy, Charles J. V. "Washington and the World."
          Fortune 55 (January 1957): 78-83.

Ploss, S. I. "The Uncertainty of Soviet Foreign Policy."
          World Politics 15 (April 1963): 455-64.

Scott, William F. "Soviet Aerospace Forces: Continuity
          and Contrast." Air Force Magazine 59 (March
          1976): 38-47.

Smolansky, Oles M. "Moscow-Cairo Crisis 1959." Slavic
          Review 22 (December 1963): 713-26.

_____. "Moscow and the Suez Crisis, 1956: A
          Reappraisal." Political Science Quarterly 80
          (December 1965): 581-605.

C. Government Publications

U.S. Department of State. United States Policy in the
          Middle East September 1956-June 1957. Near and
          Middle Eastern Series 25 (August 1957).

D. Unpublished Materials

Davis, Anne K. "Sir Anthony Eden's Response to the
          Nationalization of the Suez Canal." Master's
          thesis, San Diego State College, 1969.

Hamlett, Bruce D. "A Comparative Analysis of British
          Foreign Relations." Ph.D. dissertation,
          Claremont Graduate School, 1970.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE
SURVEY OF LITERATURE

Utility of Clarity

1. Clarity of demand and sanction tend to enhance the credibility of a given threat.

2. In the presence of ambiguity, the target will rely more heavily than otherwise on the source's concomitant actions as an index of the source's true intent and degree of resolve.

3. Clarity enhances credibility by compensating for the inability to validate empirically the source's resolve to use nuclear weapons.

4. Clarity in threats creates as well as communicates commitment by engaging values such as national prestige and bargaining reputation.

5. Clarity enhances credibility by engaging a strategy of automatism, i.e., creating the perception that the source has no choice but to employ the specified sanction if the target does not fulfill the demand.

6. The least ambiguous method of communicating a threat is through use of an ultimatum. Historically, ultimatums have reflected more of a desire on the part of the source to initiate a war than to deter it.

Functions of Ambiguity

1. Ambiguity detracts from automatism by tending to preserve options rather than limit them.

2. Ambiguity tends to reduce the credibility of a threat, thereby making compliance less likely.

3. Ambiguity allows the source to reinterpret the meaning of his own threat as the international situation becomes clarified.

4. Ambiguity allows the source to modify his position in accordance with feedback obtained from the target.

5. Ambiguity allows the source to take advantage of the target's predisposition to interpret the threat conservatively. Such a predisposition is often the result of worst case planning and the tendency to emphasize an adversary's capabilities rather than his intent.

6. An ambiguous threat tends to make target compliance more likely because it engages the target's pride and prestige to a lesser extent. The target is not so humiliated in complying with an ambiguous threat as with an explicit one.

7. Complete clarity may be self-defeating in

that source capabilities or force dispositions may be compromised.

8.   Ambiguity is useful in conveying the actual ambivalence of the source on a particular issue.

9.   Ambiguity enhances the communications function of a threat by reducing fear arousal.

Creating Ambiguity

Ambiguity may be created by the following means:

1.   Information lack; conflicting information; information overload

2.   Noise

3.   Verbal behavior, as opposed to actions

4.   Potentially unreliable intermediaries

5.   Military maneuvers and changes in the disposition of forces

6.   Manipulating the shared risk of war

7.   Instilling doubt as to identity of the source

Determinants of Ambiguity

1.   Total clarity in cross-cultural communications is impossible. Even in good faith, some degree of ambiguity will persevere.

2.   Implicit in any threat is a threshold of

provocation below which the threat is not operable. This threshold usually remains undefined.

3. The future is always uncertain, and bets must be hedged. One must allow himself a degree of flexibility with which to cope with uncertain future events.

4. Ambiguity often accurately reflects the ambivalence of source decision-makers as to what behavior constitutes a challenge to the deterrence attempt.

5. Deterrence threats must simultaneously maximize two incompatible goals: avoidance of war and defense of specific policy interests. Deterrence behavior may tend to oscillate between the two goals, thereby creating an overall impression of ambiguity.

Effects of Ambiguity

Conclusions of this section are tentative since much more laboratory and simulation research is required to verify them. They represent the best possible consensus after a survey of available literature.

1. Very high and very low degrees of ambiguity act so as to increase the target's level of fear arousal.

2. As fear arousal increases, the target will increase the level of coping behavior.

3. Very high levels of fear arousal may induce

irrational or dysfunctional manifestations of coping
behavior. The existence of an explicit demand acts so
as to block the dysfunctional effects of high fear
arousal, which may have been created by either extremely
explicit or extremely ambiguous sanctions.

a. Very high and very low degrees of
ambiguity of sanction tend to reduce the probability of
target compliance in conjuction with an ambiguous demand
and to increase probability of compliance in conjuction
with an explicit demand.

4. Intolerance of ambiguity will generate coping
behavior designed to reduce the level of ambiguity.
Understanding of this coping behavior is not yet well
enough advanced to be able to predict confidently when
such coping behavior will benefit or when it will harm
the source's goal of influencing the target's behavior.

5. Moderately ambiguous statement of a threat,
by reducing fear arousal and subsequent defensive coping
attempts, enhances the communications function of a
threat.

6. To the extent that communication increases
cooperation and conciliation, the presence of ambiguity
acts to keep a given threat system within a diplomatic
rather than purely military context, thereby increasing
the chances that war will be avoided.

APPENDIX B

DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE SOVIET
THREAT SYSTEM

Cablegram to the President of the United Nations Security
Council from the Soviet Foreign Minister, 5 November 1956:

Egypt has become a victim of aggression by the
United Kingdom, France, and Israel. Egyptian towns and
populated areas are being subjected to barbarous bombing
by Anglo-French aircraft. Landing operations have begun
and Egyptian territory is being directly invaded by the
forces of the interventionists. The number of civilian
victims is increasing and property is being destroyed.
Despite the decision of the emergency special session of
the General Assembly of the United Nations of 2 November,
concerning the cessation of military activities and the
withdrawal of all foreign troops which have invaded
Egypt, the aggressive war against Egypt is being
intensified.

This situation imposes the need for immediate and
effective action by the United Nations for the prevention
of aggression. If at this decisive moment the United
Nations is unable to curb the aggressors, the trust which
the people of the whole world place in the Organization
will be undermined and its high ideals and principles
will be trampled underfoot.

The Soviet Government, as a defender of the peace
and security of nations, calls for an immediate meeting
of the Security Council, to discuss the following
question: "Noncompliance by the United Kingdom, France,
and Israel with the decision of the emergency special
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations of
2 November 1956 and immediate steps to halt the
aggression of the aforesaid States against Egypt."

With a view to the adoption of rapid and effective
measures for stopping the aggressive war against the
Egyptian people, the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics presents the following draft
resolution to the Security Council:

"The Security Council,
"Taking note of the fact that the resolution of
the emergency special session of the General Assembly of
2 November 1956, recommending that the Governments of
the United Kingdom, France, and Israel should immediately
cease military action against Egypt and should withdraw
their troops from Egyptian territory, has not been

observed by the aforesaid States and that the military action against Egypt is continuing,

"<u>Considering</u> the necessity of taking immediate steps to put an end to the aggression launched against Egypt by the United Kingdom, France and Israel.

"<u>Proposes</u> to the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Israel that they should immediately and not later than twelve hours after the adoption of this resolution cease all military action against Egypt and withdraw within three days the troops that have invaded Egypt.

"The Security Council, in accordance with Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, considers it essential that all States Members of the United Nations, especially the United States of America and the USSR, as permanent members of the Security Council having powerful air and naval forces at their disposal, should give military and other assistance to the Egyptian Republic, which has been the victim of aggression, by sending naval and air forces, military units, volunteers, military instructors and other forms of assistance, if the United Kingdom, France and Israel fail to carry out this resolution within the stated time limits."

The Soviet Government for its part declares that it is ready to contribute to the cause of curbing the aggressors, of defending the victims of aggression and of restoring peace, by sending to Egypt the air and naval forces necessary for the achievement of this purpose.

The Soviet Government expresses its confidence that the States Members of the United Nations will take the necessary measures to defend the sovereign rights of the Egyptian State and to restore peace.

I would ask you, Mr. President, to circulate this declaration by the Soviet Government to all the members of the Security Council and to all other States Members of the United Nations.

D[MITRI] SHEPILOV
Minister for Foreign Affirs of the
Union of Soviet Socialistic [<u>sic</u>]
Republics

SOURCE:

U.S. Department of State, <u>United States Policy in the Middle East September 1956-June 1957</u>, Near and Middle Eastern Series 25 (August 1957), pp. 178-80.

Letter to President Eisenhower from Soviet Premier
Bulganin, 5 November 1956:

ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT:

In this troubled and responsible moment for the
cause of universal peace, I approach you on behalf of
the Soviet Government. One week has passed already since
the armed forces of Britain, France, and--obedient to
the will of external forces--Israel, without any reason
attacked Egypt, bringing in their wake death and
destruction. Inhuman bombardment by the British and
French Air Forces against Egyptian airfields, ports,
installations, towns, and inhabited localities is taking
place. Anglo-French troops have landed on Egyptian
territory. From the invaders' fire tremendous values
created by the hands of the Egyptian people are perishing
and the toll of human life is mounting everyday.

An aggressive war against Egypt, against the Arab
peoples whose sole fault is that they upheld their
freedom and independence, is unfolding before the eyes
of the entire world. The situation in Egypt calls for
immediate and most resolute action on the part of the
U.N. Organization. In the event such action is not
undertaken, the U.N. Organization will lose its prestige
in the eyes of mankind and will fall apart.

The Soviet Union and the United States are
permanent members of the Security Council and the two
great powers which possess all modern types of arms,
including atomic and hydrogen weapons. We bear particu-
lar responsibility for stopping war and reestablishing
peace and calm in the area of the Near and Middle East.
We are convinced that if the Governments of the USSR
and the United States will firmly declare their will to
insure peace and oppose aggression, the aggression will
be put down and there will be no war.

Mr. President, at this threatening hour, when the
loftiest moral principles and the foundations and aims
of the United Nations are being put to the test, the
Soviet Government approaches the Government of the United
States with a proposal of close cooperation in order to
put an end to aggression and to stop any further
bloodshed.

The United States has a strong navy in the zone of the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union also has a strong navy and a powerful air force. The joint and immediate use of these means by the United States and the Soviet Union according to a decision of the United Nations would be a sure guaranty of ending the aggression against the Egyptian people, against the people of the Arab East.

The Soviet Government turns to the U.S. Government with an appeal to join their forces in the United Nations for the adoption of decisive measures to put an end to the aggression. The Soviet Government has already turned to the Security Council and the special extraordinary session of the General Assembly with suitable proposals. Such joint steps of the United States and the Soviet Union do not threaten the interests of Britain and France. The popular masses of Britain and France do not want war. They, like our people, desire the maintenance of peace. Many other states also, together with Britain and France, are interested in the immediate pacification and resumption of the normal functioning of the Suez Canal, interrupted by the military operations.

The aggression against Egypt has not been committed for the sake of free navigation along the Suez Canal, which was safeguarded. The piratical war was launched with the aim of restoring colonial order in the East, an order which has been overthrown by the people. If this war is not stopped it carries the danger of turning into a third world war. .

If the Soviet Union and the United States will support the victim of the aggression, then other states, members of the United Nations, will join us in these efforts. By this the authority of the United Nations will be considerably enhanced and peace will be restored and strengthened.

The Soviet Government is ready to enter into immediate negotiations with the Government of the United States on the practical realization of the above mentioned proposals, so that effective action in the interests of peace might be undertaken within the next few hours.

At this tense moment of history, when the fate of the entire Arab East is being decided, and at the same

time the fate of the world, I await your favorable reply.

With sincere respect,

BULGANIN

SOURCE:

Ibid., pp. 180-1.

Message to British Prime Minister Eden from Soviet
Premier Bulganin, as broadcast by Soviet Home Service at
2145, 5 November 1956:

ESTEEMED MR. PRIME MINISTER:

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to
draw your attention to the fact that the launching of an
aggressive war against Egypt launched by Britain and
France, in which Israel has played the part of
instigator, is fraught with most dangerous consequences
for the cause of common peace. The extraordinary
special session of the General Assembly adopted a
decision on an immediate end to military operations and
the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of
Egypt. Disregarding this, Britain, France, and Israel
are increasing military operations, continuing the
barbarous bombing of Egyptian towns and villages, and
have landed forces on Egyptian territory, turning its
inhabited localities into ruins and killing the civilian
population.

Thus the Government of Britain together with the
Governments of France and Israel has [embarked] on an
unprovoked aggression against Egypt.

The motives put forward by Britain and the
justification of the attack against Egypt are quite
groundless. At first the British Government announced
that they were interfering in the conflict between Israel
and Egypt in order to prevent the Suez Canal from being
turned into a zone of military operations. But after
the Anglo-French intervention, the Suez Canal zone did
become a zone of military operations. Traffic through
the canal was interrupted which inflicts damage on the
states using the canal.

The attempts to justify aggression by referring
to the interests of Britain and France in the freedom of
navigation do not hold water either. We understand your
concern in the canal. However, that does not give you
the right to carry out military operations against the
Egyptian people.

At the same time, the Governments of Britain and
France cannot assume the role of judges in the questions
of the means for insuring freedom of shipping through

the Suez Canal since many other states which condemn the
aggressive actions of Britain and France and demand that
peace and calm be maintained in the Near and Middle East
are interested in this to no less an extent. Besides,
it is well known that shipping through the Suez Canal
was fully assured by Egypt. The question of the Suez
Canal was merely a pretext for Anglo-French aggression
which had different and far-reaching aims. It is
impossible to conceal that in actual fact aggressive
brigand war is at present being launched against the
Arab people, aiming at the liquidation of the national
independence of these states in the Near and Middle East
and the restoration of a regime of colonial slavery
which has been rejected by the peoples. There is nothing
that can justify the fact that the armed forces of
Britain and France, two great powers and permanent
members of the United Nations, have attacked the country
which has only recently attained its national
independence and which does not have sufficient means
for its defense.

In what position would Britain have found herself
had she been attacked by more powerful states possessing
all types of modern weapons of destruction? Indeed,
such countries, instead of sending to the shores of
Britain their naval or air forces, could have used other
means, as, for instance, rocket equipment.

If rocket weapons had been used against Britain
and France, you would have certainly called it a
barbaric action. Yet, what is the difference between
the inhuman attack perpetrated by the armed forces of
Britain and France against almost-unarmed Egypt.

Deeply perturbed by the development of events in
the Near and Middle East and guided by the interests of
preserving universal peace, we hold that the British
Government must heed the voice of common sense and stop
the war in Egypt. We call upon you, the Parliament, the
Labor Party, the trade unions, and upon the people of
Britain to stop the armed aggression, stop the bloodshed.

The war in Egypt could extend to other countries
and develop into a third world war. The Soviet Govern-
ment has already approached the United Nations and the
U.S. President with a proposal to use, together with
other members of the United Nations, naval and air
forces in order to stop the war in Egypt and to curb

aggression. We are full of determination to crush the aggressor and reestablish peace in the East by using force.

We hope that at this critical moment you will show due prudence and draw corresponding conclusions from this.

With sincere respects,

BULGANIN

SOURCE:

Ibid., pp. 183-5.

Message to French Premier Mollet from Soviet Premier
Bulganin, as broadcast by Soviet Home Service at 2155, 5
November 1956:

ESTEEMED MR. CHAIRMAN:

I deem it to be my duty to address you concerning
the situation which has arisen in connection with the
developing Franco-British aggression in Egypt. I must
declare to you with all frankness that the war against
the Egyptian state launched by France and Britain with
the use of Israel as their tool may have extremely
dangerous consequences for general peace.

An overwhelming majority of the members of the
United Nations spoke at the extraordinary special session
of the General Assembly for an immediate cessation of
military operation and for the withdrawal of foreign
troops from Egyptian territory.

And yet, military operations in Egypt are being
extended further. Egyptian towns and villages are being
subjected to barbarous bombing. French and British
troops have landed on Egyptian territory. The blood of
completely innocent people is being shed.

By acting in such a way, the Government of France,
jointly with the Governments of Britain and Israel,
entered the path of unprovoked aggression against the
Egyptian state. Although the armed attack against Egypt
is being covered by the French and British Governments
with all kinds of references to their special interest
in the normal functioning of the Suez Canal, it is
obvious now that what is involved is not the freedom of
navigation on the Suez Canal, which was safeguarded by
Egypt and which has now been interrupted by the armed
operations of France and Britain, but by the wish of the
colonizers again to place the yoke of colonial slavery
upon the peoples of the Arab East, fighting for their
national independence and freedom.

During our meeting in Moscow in May of this year,
we spoke of the fact that in your actions you are
inspired by Socialist ideals. But what has the bandit-
like armed attack against Egypt, which looks like an
open colonial war, to do with socialism?

How can one bring in line with Socialist ideas the treacherous attack by France against a country which had only achieved its independence so recently and which is not sufficiently armed to defend itself?

We are deeply convinced that the colonial war against Egypt goes counter to the fundamental interests of the French people who wish just as fervently as the peoples of Britain and the Soviet Union to preserve peace and to develop economic and cultural cooperation with other peoples.

What would be the position of France had she been attacked by other states which have at their disposal the modern terrible means of destruction?

Led by the interests of the preservation of peace, we appeal to the Government of France, as well as to the Parliament and the people of France, to stop aggression and to stop the bloodshed. We appeal to you, to the Parliament, to the Socialist Party, to the trade unions, and to the entire French people to put an end to armed aggression, stop the bloodshed.

One cannot help seeing that the war in Egypt may spread to other countries and be turned into the third world war.

I believe it my duty to inform you that the Soviet Government has already addressed the United Nations and the President of the United States with a proposal, jointly with other members of the United Nations, to use the naval and air forces to stop the war in Egypt and to curb aggression. The Soviet Government is fully determined to apply force in order to crush the aggressors and to restore peace in the East.

There is still time to use prudence, to stop and to prevent the militant forces from winning. We hope that at this decisive moment the French Government will show soberness in the evaluation of the situation which has arisen, and will draw the corresponding conclusions from it.

With sincere respect,

BULGANIN

SOURCE:

Ibid., pp. 185-6.

Message to Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion from Soviet
Premier Bulganin, as broadcast by Soviet Home Service at
2200, 5 November 1956:

MR. PREMIER:

The Soviet Government has already expressed its
definite condemnation of the armed aggression by Israel
as well as by Britain and France against Egypt which was
a direct and open violation of the Charter and principles
of the United Nations.

The overwhelming majority of the states of the
world have also condemned the act of aggression committed
with regard to the Egyptian state at a special and
extraordinary session of the General Assembly and has
called on the Governments of Israel, Britain, and France
to cease military operations forthwith and withdraw the
invading troops from the Egyptian territory.

All peace-loving mankind indignantly brands the
criminal actions of the aggressors who have attacked the
territorial entity, sovereignty, and independence of the
Egyptian state. Disregarding this, the Government of
Israel, acting as a tool of foreign imperialist powers,
continues the foolhardy adventure, challenging all the
peoples of the East who are waging a struggle against
colonialism for their freedom and independence, all the
peace-loving people of the world.

Such actions by the Government of Israel plainly
show what all the false assurances of Israel's love of
peace and its desire to coexist peacefully with the
neighboring Arab States were worth. By these assurances
the Government of Israel was in fact striving merely to
lull the vigilance of other nations, preparing a
treacherous attack against its neighbors.

Carrying out the will of other people, acting
according to instructions from abroad, the Government of
Israel is playing with the fate of peace, with the fate
of its own people, in a criminal and irresponsible
manner; it is sowing hatred for the State of Israel
among the peoples of the East which cannot but affect
the future of Israel and which will place a question
upon the very existence of Israel as a state.

Being vitally interested in the preservation of peace and in safeguarding calm in the Middle and Near East, the Soviet Government is at this moment taking measures with the aim of stopping the war and curbing the aggressors. We expect that the Government of Israel will come to its senses before it is too late and will halt its military operations against Egypt.

We appeal [to] you, the Parliament, the working people of the State of Israel, to the entire people of Israel: stop aggression; halt the bloodshed; withdraw your troops from Egyptian territory.

Taking into consideration the situation which has arisen, the Soviet Government has passed a decision to advise its Ambassador in Tel Aviv to leave Israel and immediately go to Moscow.

We hope that the Government of Israel will duly understand and appreciate our warning.

BULGANIN

SOURCE:

Ibid., pp. 187-8.

ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT

The paper attempts to fill an existing gap in the literature of strategic deterrence by presenting both a comprehensive survey of literature and a historical case study of the use of ambiguity in deterrence threats.

The survey of literature is divided into sections on the utility of clarity, functions of ambiguity, methods of creating ambiguity, determinants of ambiguity, and psychological effects of ambiguity. Information is drawn from works on military strategy, international relations, social psychology, strategic simulation, and game theory. The major findings of the survey of literature are as follows: Clarity of demand and sanction tend to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of a given threat by engaging values such as national prestige and bargaining reputation. Clarity in deterrence threats is usually associated with a strategy of automatism (denying oneself the option of backing down), while ambiguity detracts from automatism by tending to preserve options. Though the consensus of theorists is that ambiguity reduces the effectiveness of a given threat, ambiguity remains a ubiquitous element in the communication of actual deterrence threats. This

is due in great measure to the fact that a given
deterrence threat must maximize two incompatible goals
simultaneously: avoidance of war and defense of
specific policy interests.

The Soviet threat system mobilized against
Britain, France, and Israel during the 1956 Suez Crisis
is examined in the case study. In the early morning
hours of 6 November 1956 the Soviet Union dispatched
internally ambiguous and mutually contradictory messages
to the United States, United Nations, Great Britain,
France, and Israel. Close examination reveals that
subsidiary motives, i.e., motives other than the
ostensive one of effecting a cease-fire in Egypt, played
a decisive role in determining the timing and content of
the messages. The Soviet Union did not possess the
capability necessary to make good on the threats to
launch rockets against Paris and London. In addition,
Soviet actions demonstrated no resolve to introduce
troops into the Middle East except under the auspices
of the U.N. Emergency Force.

Major conclusions of the case study are as
follows: Ambiguity enabled the threats to perform a
communications function; ambiguity allowed the Soviet
Union to threaten indirectly the interests of the United
States in order that the U.S. should bring decisive

economic pressure to bear on Britain; ambiguity protected the Soviet Union's long term goals which could have been jeopardized if deterrence had failed; ambiguity allowed the Soviet Union to take advantage of the West's predisposition to exaggerate the strength of Soviet arms.

A major hypothesis of the paper that is supported by the case study is that ambiguity is correlated with the salience of subsidiary motives. Because of this, an alternative to the two-party/one-issue model of deterrence is presented. The new model emphasizes the fact that ambiguity forms a link between the highly specialized and purely military concept of deterrence and the more general context of international relations in which it is imbedded.